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AMBUSHED IN A SAFE HARBOR:
TAXATION OF INTRAFAMILIAL
INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACTS
Taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ms. Vreet has established her law practice in the small town of
Rudyard, Michigan. She earns her living by offering legal services to
members of the immediate community. One sunny afternoon in August,
Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers visited Ms. Vreet, seeking legal advice on a
2
similar matter.
Mrs. Barnes is a fifty-six year old widow living near Rudyard. At
the time of his death, Mr. Barnes owned seventy-five acres of farmland
with his wife. With the help of their son, Mr. Barnes raised crops on the
land and sold them. Although Mr. and Mrs. Barnes could always afford
to pay for food and shelter, the profits from selling the crops barely
covered their necessities. As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Barnes could not
save much money for the future. Under the terms of Mr. Barnes' will,
Mrs. Barnes became sole owner of the farmland after his death.

I As

quoted in different materials on taxation, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, "Taxes
are what we pay for a civilized society." See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EvIL xxi
(1993); SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 17 (1967). While Justice
Holmes correctly noted that taxes are necessary to support a civilized society, those taxes
should remain predictable and fair. Adam Smith, an influential economist who lived
during the latter half of the eighteenth century, created the following maxims as a guide for
the statesmen who must institute taxes:
1) Taxes should be equitable;
2) Taxes should be certain;
3) Taxes should be conveniently levied;
4) Taxes should be economical.
HAROLD M. GROvES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNrrED STATES 18 (Donald J. Curran ed., 1974). For more information on
these maxims and tax policy, see section V.A. of this Note.
2 Ms. Vreet, Mrs. Barnes, Mr. Sheers, and all other characters appearing in this section
compose a hypothetical that this Note will use to demonstrate the problems associated
with the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, and also to show the effects of
the solution to that problem. The reader should keep in mind that this Note uses this
hypothetical merely as a device for providing a clear explanation of the problems and
effects associated with the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. This
hypothetical merely presents a representative reaction to the current taxation of
intrafamilial installment sales contracts. It is not meant to suggest exactly how every
taxpayer would respond when facing the current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts.
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At fifty-six, Mrs. Barnes does not want to manage the farm, but she
still needs to replace the revenue earned from the growing and selling of
the crops. Although she dislikes the idea of parting with the farm, Mrs.
Barnes realizes that she must sell the farm to replace the lost revenue.
The local appraiser determines that the fair market value for the farm
land would be $150,000. 3 Naturally, Mrs. Barnes wants the farmland to
stay "in the family," so she asks her son, Horace, if he would be
interested in buying the farm for $150,000. Having little money himself,
Mrs. Barnes' son promises to buy the farm so long as he does not have to
pay the $150,000 in a lump sum. Of course, Mrs. Barnes agrees to the
scheduled payment arrangement. Sympathetic to her son's financial
difficulties, Mrs. Barnes does not want to charge her son more than the
fair market value for the farm. Now Mrs. Barnes asks Ms. Vreet to draft
a contract under which she would sell the farm to Horace for a series of
payments over five years totaling $150,000.
Unlike Mrs. Barnes, Mr. Sheers is a prosperous resident of Rudyard.
He owns the local grocery store and barber shop. Mr. Sheers' daughter
is a beautician. She asks her father if she can buy the barber shop and
convert it into a beauty salon. Mr. Sheers agrees, estimating that the fair
market value of the barber shop and the surrounding property is
$100,000. She cannot pay the $100,000 immediately, but convinces her
father that she will be able to pay the full price in installments. She also
offers to pay interest on top of the sale price. Mr. Sheers knows that his
daughter can afford to pay the interest. He agrees to establish a loan
arrangement consisting of principal and interest payments over the next
five years.
Because Mr. Sheers has been involved in many previous business
dealings, he commands a more sophisticated knowledge of installment
sales contracts than Mrs. Barnes. Whereas Mrs. Barnes does not consider
Valuing seventy-five acres of farmland at $150,000 may seem low. However, this
hypothetical does not place Mrs. Barnes on farmland located close to any housing or
industrial developments. Rather, Mrs. Barnes lives in a removed, rural area. The farming
equipment and the barn are not worth much either. Thus, the $150,000 appraisal would
not be outrageously low. However, for the purposes of this Note, an accurate appraisal is
not necessary. This Note only needs to assign some reasonably accurate dollar values to
Mrs. Barnes' and Mr. Sheers' property, because this Note will note use the hypothetical
dollar values to say anything about the actual worth of the land located in Rudyard, but
rather to illustrate the problems associated with the taxation of intrafamilial installment
sales contracts. Furthermore, this Note does not address taxpayers' attempts to manipulate
appraisal figures in order to gain a tax advantage. Such schemes are-always available if a
taxpayer is willing to pay enough and run the risk of an audit. See infra notes 279-286 and
accompanying text.
3
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tax implications, Mr. Sheers anticipates that the installment sales contract
with his daughter will carry tax consequences. Mr. Sheers then asks Ms.
Vreet to draft an installment sales contract that will result in the least
amount of tax liability. 4 Mr. Sheers makes no secret that he expects to
take advantage of any tax loopholes that exist in this area. 5
After assuring her clients that she can draft their installment sales
contracts, Ms. Vreet pages through the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),
looking for potential income 6 and gift 7 tax consequences. Ms. Vreet

4 Mr. Sheers wants Ms. Vreet to draft his installment sales contract to avoid, not evade,
taxes. Avoidance is an individual's manipulation of affairs within the law so as to reduce

tax liability.

SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOBLES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 102

(1978). Evasion is an illegal manipulation to avoid tax liability. Id. This Note does not
address the issue of tax evasion. For a discussion of tax evasion see generally CARL P.
SIMON & ANN D. WrrEET AL, BEATING THE SYSTEM: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY (1982).
5 Although Mr. Sheers' desire to avoid taxes is legal, his attitude toward capitalizing on tax
loopholes creates problems with other taxpayers in itself. See RONALD PASQUARIELLO, TAX
JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND MORAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN TAX POLICY 53 (1985) (pointing out that
a sense that tax loopholes are unfair is one of the primary motivations to cheat on taxes).
6 Under 26 U.S.C. § 63 (1994), Congress has the power to tax gross income minus any
deductions. This Note assumes Mr. Sheers and Mrs. Barnes cannot make any deductions
pertaining to their intrafamilial sales contracts. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994) defines gross income
as "income from whatever source derived." The question then becomes what is income for
the purposes of the IRC. Professor Simons' often repeated definition of income is the
"algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption, and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the
period in question." See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
However, Professor Simons conceded that this definition of income was too broad to
provide a workable tax base. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 84 (3d ed. 1994). The United States Supreme Court has stepped in
to narrow Simons' definition of income through an evolution of holdings. In Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920), the Court defined income as "the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided that it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets." Refining the Eisner v. Macomber
definition, the Court later held that income is "undeniable accessions to wealth, dearly
realized, and over which the taxpayer have complete dominion." See Glenshaw Glass v.
Commissioner, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Given the above definition of income, it is easy to
see that selling property to your children constitutes taxable income under 26 U.S.C. §§ 61,
63. If they sell the property for more than they originally paid for it, Mrs. Barnes and Mr.
Sheers would experience an accession to wealth, that was realized through the conversion
of the property to cash payments. They would also exercise complete dominion because
they could spend the money received for the property however they wanted.
7Under 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994), Congress may impose a tax on any property transferred by
gift. For the purposes of the IRC, the word gift is not used in its "colloquial sense," and
"donative intent"-the conventional common law test of a gift-is not a requisite of a taxable
gift. See BORIS I. BrITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 121-22 (2d ed. 1984) (citing Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306
(1945)). The Tax Court has held that to be a gift, the transfer merely needs to be donative in
character. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1059, 1064 (1960) (acq.). Although Mr.
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discovers that the installment sales contracts that Mrs. Barnes and Mr.
Sheers wish to enter into may incur both federal income and gift tax
liabilities.8 Congress has passed statutes that do not allow taxpayers to
escape tax liability on installment sales contracts that do not include
interest payments. 9 Under these statutes, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) may impute interest into a portion of the payments if the terms of
the contract do not provide for a minimum level of interest payments. 10
However, Congress also allowed an exception for qualified sales, which
occur when an individual sells or exchanges land to a member of that
individual's family.11 For a qualified sale, the safe harbor interest rate is
six percent. 12 The safe harbor prevents the IRS from imputing more than
a six percent interest rate in those qualified sales that do not include the
13
minimum level of interest.
Congress has also addressed installment sales contracts by enacting
statutes that allow the IRS to impose gift tax liability on below-market
loans. 14 A below-market loan is a loan arrangement that fails to include
minimum level interest payments.' 5 This minimum level corresponds to
the interest rate required in regular installment sales contracts to avoid

Sheers does not reveal any donative intent anyway, Mrs. Barnes may reveal some donative
intent, because she does not wish to charge any interest on the sale to her son.
8 In addition to taxing the amount of gain Mr. Sheers and Mrs. Barnes would realize from
selling the property, the IRS will impute interest into any installment sales contract that
does not provide for interest payments in an amount equal to the applicable federal rate.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 483, 1274 (1994). The IRS will also determine that Mr. Sheers and Mrs.
Barnes made a taxable gift of the amount of the forgone interest to their children if their
installment sales contracts do not provide for interest payments equal to the applicable
federal rate. See 26 U.S.C. § 7872 (1994). Under an alternative theory, the IRS could also
find that Mr. Sheers and Mrs. Barnes made a taxable gift of the forgone interest, because
failing to charge interest on a deferred sale does not constitute full and adequate
consideration for the transfer. See 26 U.S.C. § 2512 (1994). The income and gift taxation of
these contracts is dealt with later in depth. See infra section Im.
9 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 483, 1274, 2512, 7872 (1994).
10See 26 U.S.C. §§ 483, 1274, 2512, 7872 (1994). This means that the IRS will recategorize
any payment scheme that does not include enough payments for interest, thereby making
the payments for interest greater and the payments for principal less for tax purposes.
11See 26 U.S.C. § 483(e)(2). For the purposes of section 483(e), the IRC defines a family as
brothers, sisters, ancestors, and lineal descendants. See infra note 24.
12See 26 U.S.C. § 483(e)(1).
13See Id.
1426 U.S.C. § 7872 is one provision that handles the treatment of below-market loans for
gift tax purposes. 26 U.S.C. § 2512 does not explicitly discuss below-market loans, but it
does require full and adequate consideration for a transfer of property to avoid gift tax
liability. A below-market loan is a transfer of property for below full and adequate
consideration. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
15See 26 U.S.C. § 7872(e)(1).
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the imputation of income tax. 16 However, the minimum level employed
to determine a below-market loan significantly exceeds the safe harbor
rate for qualified sales.1 7 Here, Ms. Vreet recognizes a discrepancy. A
seller involved in a qualified sale could include a six percent interest rate
and receive a safe harbor from the imputation of interest for income tax
purposes, but not for gift tax purposes. 18 Thus, compliance under one
section of the IRC results in liability under another, and the safe harbor
becomes a gift tax trap.19
Unfortunately, the case law interpreting these provisions does not
reconcile the conflicting requirements between the gift and income tax
provisions of the IRC pertaining to qualified sales. Furthermore, a
conflict exists between the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, with
regard to the reach of the safe harbor provision. The Seventh Circuit has
held that the safe harbor for qualified sales protects taxpayers from
undesirable income and gift tax liability. 20 The Eighth and Tenth
The minimum level of interest for the income and gift tax provisions pertaining to
installment sales contracts is the applicable federal rate as determined under 26 U.S.C. §
1274(d). See 26 U.S.C. § 483(b); 26 U.S.C. § 7872(0(2). Because the applicable federal rate is
gauged to be dose to the prevailing market interest rate, the IRS would probably use that
rate to determine full and adequate consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2512.
17 The imputed interest rate used to be determined with the fixed percentage rate found in
26 U.S.C. § 483. However, Congress concluded that using a fixed test rate resulted in an
imputation rate which was frequently less than the prevailing market rates. Burton W.
Kanter & Sheldon I. Banoff, Have Imputed Interest Amendments Backfired?, 65 J. TAX'N 375
(1986). Congress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 1274 to attempt to maintain a test rate closer to
the prevailing market rate by replacing a fixed test rate with a floating rate equal to the
applicable federal rate, compounded semiannually. Id. Prevailing market interest rates
exceeded six percent in the 1980's because of high inflation, continued deficit spending by
the federal government, and an ever increasing national debt. See Frank J. Slagle,
Accountingfor Interest: An Analysis of OriginalIssue Discount in the Sale of Property,32 S.D. L.
REV. 1(1987).
18Consider a person who wishes to sell a hundred acres of land to her daughter. Because
her daughter is her lineal descendant, the person could set up an installment sales contract
with a six percent interest rate and remain free from imputed interest. See 26 U.S.C. §
483(e); 26 U.S.C. § 1274(c)(3)(F). However, the IRS would still use the applicable federal
rate to determine if the person's installment sales contract will incur gift tax liabilily. See 26
U.S.C. § 7872(0(2); 26 U.S.C. § 2512. The applicable federal rate is higher than six percent.
See supra note 17. Therefore, including a six percent interest rate, in lawful compliance with
section 483(e), will prevent the IRS from using the applicable federal rate to impute
additional interest for income tax purposes, but the IRS will still use the applicable federal
rate to impute additional interest for gift tax purposes.
19See Jay D. Benjamin, Note, The Safe-HarborInterest Rates Under Section 483 of the Internal
Revenue Code: A Gift Tax Trap, 20 IND. L. REV. 679 (1987) (pointing out that use of an
inappropriate interest rate in installment sales contracts can create unforeseen gift tax
consequences for related parties, because the IRC applies two different rates in these
situations: the market rate and the safe harbor rate).
20 See Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185,188 (7th Cir. 1988).
16
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Circuits have disagreed and held that the safe harbor interest rate for the
imputation of income tax is irrelevant for the purposes of gift tax
valuation. 21 The Tax Court has held repeatedly that the safe harbor rate
does not protect taxpayers from gift tax liability. 22
Ms. Vreet grows perplexed and slumps back into her chair. She
cannot adequately advise her clients about the income and gift tax
consequences of their desired installment sales contracts.23 For both Mrs.
Barnes and Mr. Sheers, selling the property to their children constitutes a
qualified sale. 24 Ms. Vreet can include a six percent interest rate and
insulate her clients from the imputed income tax liability, but she cannot
promise that the safe harbor rate will protect them from potential gift tax
liability.25 Ms. Vreet must either draft installment sales contracts that
require interest payments up to the minimum level required for gift tax
purposes or include the safe harbor rate that may subject her clients to
undesirable gift tax liability. 26 The best that Ms. Vreet can do is to tell
Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers the current legal situation and hope that
neither one storms out of her office in disgust.27

21See Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v.
Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529,533 (8th Cir. 1991).
22See Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 585 (1992); Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 887, 890 (1990), aff'd with the separateconcurring opinion of Judge Henley by Krabbenhoft
v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (1991); Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323, 327
(1987), rev 'd by Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (1988).
23The United States Supreme Court never reconciled this conflict in the Circuits. Thus, the
holdings of the Seventh, Eighth, or Tenth Circuits do not bind the Sixth Circuit, which is
the United States Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over Michigan, Ms. Vreet's state of
practice. See DIANA V. PRATr, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIc APPROACH 38 (2d ed. 1993)
(stating that under the rule of stare decisis, a court is bound by cases that it has already
decided previously and by all court decisions of a higher court in its system).
2426 U.S.C. § 483(e)(2) states that the term "qualified sale" means any sale or exchange of
land by an individual to a member of such individual's family within the meaning of
section 267(c)(4). 26 U.S.C. § 267(c)(4) (1994) limits the family of an individual to brothers,
sisters, spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. Mrs. Barnes' son and Mr. Sheers'
daughter are certainly their lineal descendants and therefore qualify as members of the
families of Mr. Sheers and Mrs. Barnes within the meaning of 26 U.S.C.§ 267(c)(4).
25
See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
26The conflict in the circuits opens two different approaches for taxpayers who enter into
qualified sales involving an installment sales contract. See Courtney N. Stillman, Choosing
Interest Rates for Family TransactionsTo Avoid a Gift As Well As Imputed Income, 83 J. TAX'N
155 (1995). A taxpayer can either take an aggressive position and use the safe harbor rate
that may result in a confrontation with the IRS, or the taxpayer could take a conservative
position and use the slightly higher applicable federal rate that would create no unforeseen
tax liability. Id.
27Both the aggressive and conservative positions are unacceptable for Mrs. Barnes because
she does not have the resources to litigate the matter with the IRS nor does she have the
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The IRC should be clear so that an attorney in Ms. Vreet's position
can give tax advice with certainty. 28 Furthermore, anyone in Mrs.
Barnes' or Mr. Sheers' situation should not have to include interest
payments above the safe harbor rate in order to avoid gift tax
consequences. 29 This Note proposes that once the six percent safe harbor
interest rate is written into an intrafamilial installment sales contract, the
seller should not only be free from the imputed interest for income tax
purposes, but also from gift tax liability for a below-market loan.
Congress should amend the IRC to include a section that permits a
taxpayer to write the safe harbor rate into an intrafamilial installment
sales contract without incurring adverse income or gift taxes. 3°
Section II of this Note will examine some basic concepts relating to
31
the time value of money implicated by installment sales contracts.
Section HI will discuss the legislative attempts to tax installment sales
contracts according to their appropriate time value of money. 32 Section
IV will chronologically recount the cases that have created confusion
about the extent to which the safe harbor rate of 26 U.S.C. § 483(e)
applies for gift tax valuation. 33 Section V will show that the safe harbor
rate of 26 U.S.C. § 483(e) must apply for both income and gift tax
purposes in order to remain consistent with good tax policies. 34 After
emphasizing why the safe harbor needs reform, Section V will also
demonstrate how that reform may be implemented. 35 Section VI will
propose a statutory amendment that will properly reform the IRC so that
taxpayers who include the safe harbor in an intrafamilial installment
sales contract will insulate themselves from additional income or gift tax
6
liability.3

money to pay the additional gift tax. Although Mr. Sheers could afford to pay the gift tax,
he does not want to pay a higher tax if he can avoid it. Also, Mr. Sheers could afford
litigation on this issue, but paying this cost would defeat his underlying purpose of saving
money. Thus, although the situation is undesirable for both, it is much bleaker for Mrs.
Barnes. See infra notes 250-253 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 257-261 and accompanying text.
29Senators Mechler, Boschwitz, Grassley, and Jespen express some of the policy reasons
why someone in Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers should not need to include an interest rate
higher than the safe harbor. See infra note 120.
30 See infra notes 328-338 and accompanying text.
31See infra notes 37-77 and accompanying text.
32
See infra notes 78-161 and accompanying text.
33See infra notes 162-236 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 245-278 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 302-338 and accompanying text.
36 See infra section VI.
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II.

THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY AND INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACTS

This section begins by discussing two central concepts of the time
value of money. Next follows the effect of the time value of money on
installment sales and how taxpayers can manipulate installment sales
contracts to gain a tax benefit. This manipulation prompted Congress to
realize that it needed to pass statutes that tax the time value of money
accurately.
A.

Central Concepts of the Time Value of Money

In order to demonstrate how taxpayers can manipulate installment
sales contracts, two central concepts of the time value of money require
explanation. Those two concepts are lost investment opportunity and
present value.
1.

Lost Investment Opportunity

Although calculating the time value of money depends on many
circumstances, 37 the fundamental principle of the time value of money is
that an amount of money in the present is worth more than the same
amount of money in the future. 38 The value of a fixed amount of money
decreases over time because of lost investment opportunities. 39 In other
37See DANIEL Q. PosN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF INDIvUALS: WITH DIAGRAMS FOR

EASY UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEADNG CASES AND CoNcEPTs 1-33 (3d ed. 1997) for a
discussion of these subjects, including the growth of capital, interest, present value
analysis, and simple and compound interest. Posin's text also addresses how the time
value of money can eliminate taxes, create multimillionaires, allow a corporation to run
over a pedestrian for a profit, and affect the calculations of original issue discount. This
Note's central thesis concerns the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, and
therefore does not need to address the time value of money beyond its application in the
context of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. Of course, the time value of money is a
key principle involved in numerous other areas including accounting, finance, and
business. For more information about the time value of money outside the scope of this
Note see generally Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
637, 657-663 (1997); Stephen B. Land, Contingent Payments and the Time Value of Money, 40
TAX L. REV. 237 (1987); Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REV 9
(1986); Theodare S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation,and the Tale of a Teakettle: Tax Shelter
Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1994).
3
8 Another way to consider this concept is in terms of future debt or repayment of debt: the
present value of a future expense obligation or a future receipt right is worth less than its
stated amount. JAMEs S. EUSTICE, THE TA REFORM Acr OF 1984: A SELECTvE ANALYSIS 2-2
(1984). Simply stated, a dollar in hand today is worth more than the dollar in hand
tomorrow. Id.
39 Daniel Posin offers a clear example of an investment opportunity situation. POSIN, supra
note 37, at 7. He explains that $100 today is more valuable because the money can earn a
six percent interest rate in a savings account and grow to $106 after a year. POSIN, supra
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words, if a person is given $10,000 today, that person can invest that
$10,000 and collect a yield based on a certain percentage of the $10,000
over the next five years. 4° A second person who instead receives $10,000
after five years does not have the opportunity to invest this money and
will ultimately have less money than the person who could invest the
money immediately.41 Thus, the time value of money can be defined as
the amount of money given at a certain date plus the amount of the
investment opportunity. 42
2.

Present Value

Another key principle involved with the time value of money is
present value. 43 Because the value of money can grow over time, a
future sum of money has a different value than the same present sum of
money. 44 For example, if a person wants to purchase a $30,000 car in five
note 37, at 7. Although depositing money into a savings account is not the most lucrative
investment, the $6 increase does provide an investment return. Not possessing the money

in the present denies any person the opportunity to acquire an investment return. See also
MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1132 (including a similar discussion about investment
opportunities using a dollar and a ten percent interest rate). Inflation also decreases the
value of a fixed amount of money over time. See ROBERT S. MORRISON, INFLATION CAN BE
STOPPED 3 (1973) (defining inflation more precisely as a general and continuing increase in
the price of raw materials, products, services, real estate, intangibles, wages, taxes, and
other items for which money is paid). This Note is concerned with the effect of the time
value of money on one person, rather than on all the people, within an economic system.
Opportunity costs affect a single person within an economic system and merit further
discussion in this Note. However, inflation affects the time value of money for all people
within an economic system, so this Note does not address it any further. For more
discussion on inflation see generally MORRISON, supra this footnote.
40 The certain percentage of $10,000 is interest, which the Supreme Court defined as
"compensation for the use or forbearance of money." See United States v. Midland-Ross
Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965). In other words, interest is the amount that a person has
contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money.
See Old Colony Railroad Co. v.
Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1931). A person who borrows money must compensate
the lender, because borrowing the money denies the lender's investment opportunity. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
41 Conversely, a person given a lump sum of money not owed until a later date will receive
a benefit from being able to invest this money early. See David L. Roberts & William F.
Landesa, Inflation and the Present Value of Future Economic Damages, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 93,
94 (1982).
42 See POSIN, supra note 37, at 7. The time value of money could also be defined as the
amount of money given at a certain date minus the amount of an investment return. See
Roberts & Landesa, supra note 41.
This term appears numerously throughout the I.R.C. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 42, 56, 72,143, 149,
280G, 401, 404, 411, 412, 414, 416, 417, 420, 457, 467, 483, SOI, 514, 832, 846, 60E, 8601, 1272,
1274, 1298, 1379E, 4980, 7448, 7872 (1994).
" P0SIN, supra note 37, at 7. The value of a fixed amount of money can also decrease over
time because of inflation. See MORRISON, supra note 39, at 3.
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years, that person does not need to set aside $30,000 now. Assume that
this person finds an account that bears an eight percent interest rate
compounded annually. If that person deposits $18,905.09 into that
account today, she will have $30,000 after five years.45 Present value
then is the current worth of a future sum of money. 46 Having abstractly
defined lost investment opportunity and present value, these concepts
can be concretely applied to installment sales of real property.
B. Time Value of Money Analysis Applied to Installment Sales Contracts
In the context of an installment sale of real property, the seller does
not receive the total payment for the purchased land at the time of the
48
sale.47 The seller then experiences a loss of investment opportunity.

what sum of money a person needs to set aside now to produce $30,000 after five
years depends on the rate of interest involved and how the interest is compounded. Slagle,
supra note 17, at 21. Present value can be determined using the following equation:
45Exactly

PV =

FV

(1+I)n

where "PV" is present value, "I" is the interest rate, "FV" is the future value, and "N," is
the number of compounding periods in which the interest will accrue. See McDANIEL ET
AL, supra note 6, at 1268. This formula then allows the person who wants to buy a $30,000
car in five years to calculate how much he will need to invest in an account that bears an
eight percent interest rate compounded annually. The desired "FV" is 30,000, the "I" is .08
(8/), and the "N" is S (compounding annually means once a year for five years).
Replacing these variables yields the following equation:
PV = 30.000
(1+.08)5
Crunching these numbers through the formula demonstrates that the present value equals
18905.09. This means that the person who wants a $30,000 car only needs to invest
$18905.09 in the proper account to have the car after five years. For another application of
this formula, see McDANIEL ET AL, supra note 6, at 1269.
46 Slagle, supra note 17, at 21.
47 Two of the financing agreements that contracting parties use to govern the installment
sales of real property are mortgages and installment land contracts. JOHN E. CRIBBEr Er AL.,
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 997 (7th ed. 1996). A mortgage document conveys the
land from the buyer to the seller, but the object of the document is not to effect a sale of
land, but to provide security for the payment of debt. KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW (5th ed.
1996), reprinted in JOHN E. CRIBBEr ET AL, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1001 (1996).
An installment land contract does not give title to the buyer as the mortgage does.
OSBORNE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1967) reprinted in JOHN E. CRiBBET ET AL., PROPERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1007 (1996). However, the buyer under an installment land contract
occupies a similar relative position to the buyer under a mortgage, because both take
possession of the property under either document. Id. Thus the seller turns over real
property for possession without receiving full payment for the purchase price of the land.
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Because some buyers cannot afford to pay the seller the total purchase
price in one lump sum, these buyers must compensate the seller for the
loss of investment opportunity. 49 Otherwise, the seller would hold the
land until someone would pay the full purchase price, insuring that the
seller suffers no loss.5° In this scenario, the buyer will need to pay
interest to compensate the seller's lost investment opportunity.51 The
buyer and seller generally determine the amount of interest based on a
percentage of the principal.5 2 Then, the buyer and seller construct a
contract in order to govern the amount of interest and principal that the
buyer must pay at the end of every pay period.5 3
Normally when two parties enter into a loan arrangement, 54 each
party negotiates the terms of the contract in favor of their own economic
interest.5s
The seller wants to receive full compensation for the

48 If the seller had the total purchase price, the seller would be able to invest all of that

money. Under a deferred payment plan, the seller only receives a portion of the total

purchase price at the time of the sale. See supra note 47. Thus, if the buyer paid under a
deferred payment plan, the seller can only invest a portion of the total sale price at the time
of the sale, whereas if the buyer paid the total purchase price immediately, the seller could
invest the total purchase price at the time of the sale. Compare supra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
49Both Mrs. Barnes' son and Mr. Sheers' daughter fall into this situation. See supra section I.
so Basic economic theory contends that people will maximize their wealth if given the
opportunity to voluntarily contract for an exchange. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN &
RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRACT LAW 1-7 (1979).
51 For a definition of interest see supra note 40.
52 The principal is the present sale price of the property. The buyer and seller use the
principal as a base because the principal represents the value of the land that will decrease
overtine and require compensation. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
z Historically, the courts and the IRS have respected the contracting parties' choice to
allocate the payments as to principal and interest. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Planning or
Interest After TRA 1984: Unstated Interest and OriginalIssue Discount, 43 INST. OF FED. TAX'N
23-1, 23-41 (1985). See also Sefton v. Commissioner, F.2d 399, 401, 402 (9th Cir. 1961); O'Dell
v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 592, 597, 600 (1956); Huntington-Redondo Co. v. Commissioner,
36 B.T.A. 116,117 (1937); EP Greenwood v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1209, 1214-1215 (1936);
Rev. Rul. 70-647,2 (1970); Rev. Rul. 63-57, 2 (1963).
54Demand and term loans are two loan arrangements specifically recognized by the IRC.
26 U.S.C. § 7872(f)(5), (6) (1994). The IRC defines a demand loan as any loan that is payable
in full at any time at the lender's demand. 26 U.S.C § 7872(f)(5). The IRC defines a term
loan as any loan that is not a demand loan. 26 U.S.C. § 7872(f)(6). A more independent
definition of a term loan is any loan that is not a demand loan, where the loan agreement
specifies an ascertainable period of time during which the loan must remain outstanding.
See Katherine C. Bairey & Thomas D. Terry, Executive Compensation and the Time Value of
Money, 39 MAJOR TAX PLANNING 13-1,13-7-8 (1987).
55 To determine whether a party protected its economic self-interest, the United States
Supreme Court uses an ordinary course of business test. See Commissioner v. Wermyss,
324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (accepting the Treasury Regulations conclusion that no genuine
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devaluation of the sale price over time, while the buyer wants to pay no
more than is absolutely necessary to compensate the seller.5 6 However,
pure economic interests do not always motivate a buyer and seller,57 and
sometimes they enter into installment sales contracts that do not protect
their economic interests. 58 When people sell property to family members
or friends, benevolence often motivates them more than the desire to
make a profit.5 9
Sometimes contracting parties draft the terms of their installment
sales contracts intentionally to avoid certain tax consequences.w6
61
Different deferred payment plans carry different tax consequences.
62
The sale of a piece of property results in income for the seller, assuming
that the property is sold for more than its original cost to the seller. 63
business transaction exists when a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property is not made
in the ordinary course of business, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent).
56This statement

also hinges on the economic theory mentioned supra note 50.
Here the basic economic theory that people act to maximize personal wealth breaks
down. In actuality, rational, economic judgment does not always inform a person's
decision-making process. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 70-71 (Everyman's Library ed.,
J.M. Dent & Sons LTD 1970) (1651) (noting that a human's ambition, avarice, anger, and
other passions would make it impossible to maintain a contractual relationship between
two human beings without the fear of some coercive power).
5 See Helvering v. Robinette, 129 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that a daughter made a
gift to trustees when she irrevocably transferred property to them in exchange for the
promise to receive income payments from the property for the rest of her life). People enter
into loan arrangements without protecting their economic interest for items other than real
property as well. See Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995) (involving a
transfer of stock in exchange for promissory notes including the fair market value of the
stock and a six percent interest rate).
59 See Fehrs v. U.S. 620 F.2d 255 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (noting that intrafamilial transfers of land
prompt special tax scrutiny because the genuineness of the transactions generally lack
circumstantial assurances of business purpose).
60Congress recognized that sometimes taxpayers construct installment contracts vaguely in
order to avoid paying ordinary income from the interest received under the deferred
payment schedule. H.R. REPORT No. 88-749 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313,
1381.
61 See Joseph G. Walsh, Time Value of Money Concepts, 45 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 33-1, 33-4, 6-7
(1987) (demonstrating how a seller's income could be either $450 of ordinary income and
$500 of capital gain or $516 of ordinary income and $434 of capital gain on the same debt
instrument, depending on how and when the instrument accounts for interest payments).
6226 U.S.C. § 61(a)(3) (1994) (specifically including gains derived from dealings in property
in gross income). Because a single sale of property results in a gain that is casual and
nonrecurrent, one line of thinking, more prevalent in Great Britain than in the United
States, argues that this gain is not income. See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX 187-191 (1964) (discussing the different tax perceptions of capital gains in America and
Great Britain).
63 The I.R.C. calls the original cost to the seller basis. 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). However,
basis does not equal cost in all circumstances. Basis is an involved concept in taxation and
not the subject of this Note. For a more detailed discussion of basis, see generally John J.
57
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Likewise, any amount the seller acquires above the cost of the property
will constitute a capital gain. 64 Any amount the seller receives as interest
on the sale price would constitute ordinary income. 65 Although these
capital gains are still a form of income, 66 Congress has chosen to tax
capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income tax.67 In an
intrafamilial installment sales contract, the federal government considers
interest payments to be ordinary income and principal payments to be
capital gains. 68 This special capital gains treatment prompts taxpayers to
manipulate installment sales contracts in order to gain a tax advantage.
C. Taxpayer Manipulation of Installment Sales Contracts To Gain a Tax
Advantage
Applying the time value of money analysis to Mrs. Barnes' and Mr.
Sheers' situations illustrates how taxpayers can manipulate the terms of
their installment sales contracts to gain a tax advantage. 69 Mrs. Barnes
Potts, Did Your Law Professor Tell You Basis Means Cost? The Recognition Theory of Basis, 22
VAL. U. L. REV. 233 (1988).
6Income on the buying and selling of property receives capital gains tax treatment if the
sold or exchanged property is a capital asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (1994). A capital asset is any
property which does not include 1) inventory or stock in trade; 2) depreciable property
used in a trade or business; 3) a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a copyright, or
similar property held by the taxpayer who performed the efforts to create such property; 4)
accounts or notes receivable, 5) certain government publications. 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994). It
looks like number two of section 1221 disqualifies Mr. Sheers' and Mrs. Barnes' property,
because realty or farmlands are depreciable assets used in a trade or business. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 167(a)(1) (1994). However, the IRC makes an exception for these assets that allows them
to still receive capital gains treatment in the case of a gain. 26 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994). Thus,
the sale or exchange of Mr. Sheers' or Mrs. Barnes' property would certainly qualify for
capital gains treatment under sections 1221 and 1222.
6526 U.S.C. § 61(a)(4) (specifically including interest payments in gross income).
6See McDANIEL Er AL, supra note 6, at 75, 76 (explaining that capital gains from the sale of
property fit the definition of income, because the sale of property can still result in an
accession to wealth).
67 See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (1994). See also McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 6, at 799 (commenting
that the twenty-eight percent maximum tax rate for net capital gains prevents a taxpayer
from being subjected to tax at a higher marginal rate). For a discussion of the policy
reasons for providing special tax treatment on capital gains, see generally David J.Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986);
Debroah M. Weiss, Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair?Stimulating Savings Through Differentiated
Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1993); George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital
Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues Efficiency, and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419 (1993).
68 The only difference between an intrafamilial installment sales contract and a regular
installment sales contract is that the former effects a qualified sale and the latter does not.
See 26 U.S.C. § 483(e).
The application of the income and capital gains tax principles to Mr. Sheers' and Mrs.
Barnes' situations in this paragraph does not account for the imputed interest income taxes
and aid tax provisions in an effort to reveal the tax consequences of their desired
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needs to receive a fair price for her farm in order to survive; yet she does
not want to charge her son any interest on the sale. She could set up an
installment sales contract that would include only principal payments.
Without receiving interest, Mrs. Barnes would not be earning any
ordinary income. 70 Motivated by benevolence for her son, she would
only pay the cheaper capital gains tax on the principal payments. Thus,
a non-tax avoidance motive would allow Mrs. Barnes to receive the
special capital gains treatment.
71
On the other hand, Mr. Sheers is admittedly trying to avoid taxes.
He could sell his barber shop at a price high enough to account for his
lost investment opportunity if he were to set up an installment sales
contract composed of inflated principal payments. In essence, Mr.
Sheers would receive both interest and principal payments, but the
terms of the contract would characterize the interest as part of the
principal and allow Mr. Sheers to avoid paying the higher ordinary
income tax. Ultimately, Mr. Sheers can manipulate the terms of his
installment sales contract so that he can receive a form of ordinary
income, interest, and pay the cheaper capital gains tax on it. The
manipulation of installment sales contracts to avoid paying ordinary
income tax on interest payments spurred a congressional reaction.

D. CongressionalReaction to the Manipulationof Installment Sales Contracts
Regardless of whether the desire to avoid tax liability motivates a
seller, Congress recognized that the manipulation of the principal and
interest payments in installment sales contracts results in unacceptable
tax breaks. 72 Congress refused to allow a tax break for those who did
not explicitly allocate a portion of their installment payments as
interest.' 3 Any installment sales contract containing terms that did not
installment sales contracts without these special provision. This Note discusses Mr. Sheers'

and Mrs. Barnes' installment sales contracts among the imputed interest rules and
below-market loan provisions in detail later. See infra notes 92-95, 98-100, 144-148 and
accompanying text.
70
The reader may have noticed that lowering the payments to below the annual exclusion
would not seem to result in gift tax. Although this sounds logical, the annual exclusion
does not prevent gift tax on installment sales contracts this easily. See infra notes 132, 148
and accompanying text.
71 Mr. Sheers' tax avoidance mentality has created substantial problems for the IRS. See
Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critiqueof ABA Formal Opinion
85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643, 661(1986) (stating that nonpayment of taxes through homemade
loopholes and unreported income is a colossal social problem); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The
Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Example, TUL. L. REV. 2345, 2359 (1996) (noting that'
our current tax system is unfair, often levying different burdens on people with the same
income).
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explicitly account for the time value of money became suspect. 74
Congress believed that taxpayers should not rearrange the terms of their
installment sales contracts simply to avoid certain tax liabilities. 75 To
preserve the integrity of its system of taxation 7 6 Congress recognized the
need to pass statutes that taxed installment sales contracts based on the
time value of money. 77 The next section describes Congress' efforts to
impose both income and gift taxes on the appropriate time value of the
seller's money under the terms of an economically unhampered
installment sales contract.
Ill. TAXATION OF THE TIME VALUE OF INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACTS

Installment sales contracts of real property may constitute both a
source of income to and a gift from the seller. 78 The seller of real
property through an installment sales contract can receive principal
payments that produce a capital gain9 and interest payments that
72See H.R. REPORT No. 88-749 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.A.N. 1313, 1381 (stating that
manipulation of the tax law in this manner is undesirable).
73 It appears that Congress assumes taxpayers always receive interest payments in an
installment sales contract. Note the following language: "Your committee sees no reason
for not reporting amounts as interest income merely because the seller and purchaser did
not specifically provide for interest payments. This treats taxpayers differently in what are
essentially the same circumstances merely on the grounds of the names assigned to the
payments." If taxpayers who allocate a portion of the payment for interest are treated
differently from those who do not provide for interest payments, then both must receive
interest payments. However, this is not always true. Mrs. Barnes would not include any
allocation for interest payments in her installment sales contract because she would not
actually be receiving any interest. This raises issues of equity discussed infra at notes
245-256 and accompanying text.
- H.R. REPORT No. 88-749 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1381 (noting that the
committee's bill poses a solution to the problem created when the terms of an installment
loan do not include a high enough interest rate).
75Id. (asserting that a buyer and seller distort the treatment of payments in an installment
sales contract depending on the tax advantages).
76If taxpayers could simply label their transactions using a nomenclature that the IRC does
not identify, taxpayers could avoid paying taxes altogether. Even though the IRC and the
taxpayer would mean the same thing, a jurisprudence that relied on form over substance
would not allow tax liability to attach when the language of the IRC did not match the
language used by the taxpayer. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that substance must govern over form in tax matters. See Diedrich v.
Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 195 (1982); Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 461 (1959);
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716,729 (1929).
7 See Slagle, supra note 17, at 5 (pointing out that Congress has attempted to prevent
taxpayers from converting ordinary interest income into capital gains income in installment
transactions since 1964). See also notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
78See supra note 8.
7See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 11

324 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
constitute ordinary income.80 In addition, if the seller allows the buyer
to purchase the property below its market value, the seller may also
make a partial gift of the property to the buyer. 81 As a result, Congress
eventually attached both income and gift tax liability to certain forms of
installment sales contracts. 82 This section first discusses the enactment of
section 483 and section 1274, both of which handle the income taxation
of installment sales contracts.
Next this section scrutinizes the
long-standing valuation standard of section 2512 and the enactment of
section 7872, both of which govern the gift taxation, of installment sales
contracts.
A. Income Taxation of Installment Sales Contracts
The current imputed interest rules have changed a great deal since
their inception. Those rules began in the original enactment of section
483. However, this version caused problems that prompted Congress to
amend section 483 to include the safe harbor rate. The original version
of section 483 also created other problems that eventually warranted the
enactment of a new section containing updated imputed interest rules,
namely section 1274. The following paragraphs analyze the original
version of section 483 and its changes through the years.
1.

The Original Enactment of Section 483

In 1964, Congress reacted to the manipulation of an installment sales
contract's terms to seemingly remove any interest paymentss 3 It
amended the IRC to include section 483,84 which was designed to impute
interest payments in an installment contract no matter how the

80 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
82 Congress created a tax liability for imputed interest on installment sales contracts in the
income tax sphere much earlier then it did in the gift tax sphere. H.R. REPORT No. 88-749
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1381-82 (in which Congress formulates the
imputed interest taxation rules); H.R REPORT No. 98-432 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.
N. 1017 (when twenty years after the formation of the original imputed interest rules,
Congress architects the below-market loan rules applying gift tax to certain installment
sales). However, gift tax liability through the valuation of an installment sales contract
could be attached much earlier than the enactment of the imputed interest provisions in
either income or gift taxation, section 2512 has been part of the I.R.C. since 1954. See
Internal Revenue Act of 1954, 68A Stat. 406 (1954).
83See supranotes 72-75 and accompanying text.
84 For the text of 26 U.S.C. § 483 as it appeared in 1964 see Internal Revenue Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 77 (1964).
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contractual terms characterized the payments.8 This meant that if a
seller inflated the principal payments to include an unstated interest,
section 483 allowed the IRS to ignore the contractual terms and name a
certain portion of the payments as interest. 86 In its original version,
section 483 required an installment sales contract to include a minimal
test rate for interest payments.Y If the loan arrangement required
interest payments in an amount equal to or above the test rate, the seller
could avoid imputed interest under the loan arrangement.88 Thus,
section 483 allowed the IRS to manufacture fictitious interest payments if
the taxpayers did not include the test rate in their installment sales
contracts.
a)

Legal Fiction Under Section 483

Rather than achieving Congress' stated purpose for enacting section
483, 89 the imputation of interest under section 483 created a legal
fiction.90 Under section 483, the IRS viewed every installment sales
contract as providing for interest payments, no matter whether the
parties negotiated for an interest payment. Even if a seller genuinely did
not include or receive any interest payments under the installment sales
contract, the IRS could assess an ordinary income tax on interest that
does not exist. 91 This legal fiction introduced a problem. It imposed
5 See Philip E. Harris, Imputed Interest on Installment Sales After the 1984 Tax Reform Act As
Amended, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 227 (1985) (commenting that section 483 was supposed to
plug the loophole created when taxpayers camouflage interest as a higher purchase price in
an installment sale). See also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
86See Benjamin, supra note 19, at 680-683 (explaining that section 483 recharacterizes the
installment sales contract to include a portion of the amount of interest that should have
been, but was not, stated in the contract).
87 The original version of section 483 gave the Secretary of the Treasury the power to
determine the test rate and discount or revalue the installment sales contract based on that
rate. See section (b) of the 1964 version of section 483, supra note 84.
8 See Benjamin, supra note 19, at 682-683 (providing three examples in which the imputed
interest income is computed for installment sales contracts that do not include an interest
rate
as high as the test rate of section 483).
89
See section (a) of the 1964 version of section 483, supranote 84.
90A legal fiction is pragmatically defined as a falsehood that is deemed true for limited
purposes. John A. Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictionsand the Tax Code,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993). It is not surprising that a legal fiction exists in the taxation
of installment sales contracts, because the formalistic and inflexible nature of tax law
provides a fertile area for legal fictions to flourish. Id. at 3.
91Here lies the falsehood that creates the fiction: an installment sales contract that does not
include any interest payments in reality is deemed to include interest payments for tax
purposes. To describe this another way, section 483 allows the IRS to completely rewrite a
taxpayer's installment sates contract in order to determine tax liability. If the minimum test
rate is ten percent and a taxpayer only names principal payments of $5,000, the IRS will
recharacterize these payments so that $500 of the payment is for interest. Even though the
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interest as an indestructible entity on any deferred payment schedule
regardless of what the parties intended or actually received. 92
Mr. Sheers' and Mrs. Barnes' situations both illustrate the problem
and effect caused by the legal fiction of indestructible interest. Mr.
Sheers plans to compensate himself for the investment loss he would
receive on a deferred payment plan. He calculates how much interest he
needs as compensation and then simply tacks that amount onto the sale
price. Thus, his installment sales contract explicitly requires only
principal payments while it implicitly includes both interest and
principal payments. 93 Section 483 flushes out the interest payments that
Mr. Sheers intended to receive from the beginning and taxes them
accordingly. 94
However, Mrs. Barnes wants Ms. Vreet to draft the terms of her
installment sales contract so that they do not include interest payments.
Mrs. Barnes neither intends to receive interest payments, nor will she
actually receive them under the terms of the installment sales contract
that she desires. However, the IRS could rely on section 483's legal
fiction to manufacture interest where Mrs. Barnes had excluded interest.
With the indestructible interest created under section 483, the IRS could
draft interest payments into the terms of Mrs. Barnes' installment sales
contract, forcing Mrs. Barnes to pay ordinary income tax on interest that
she never receives. In order to avoid section 483 tax liability on income
that Mrs. Barnes does not receive, Mrs. Barnes would need to include the
test rate level of interest. To secure the test rate, Mrs. Barnes must
negotiate the terms of her installment sales contract with her son as if he
were an adversarial party in the ordinary course of business. 95 However,
Congress did attempt to remedy this situation.

seller does not receive the $500 in interest, the IRS taxes the seller as if she did receive $500
in interest.
92 The indestructibility of interest is not the only problem the enactment of section 483
caused. See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
93 Mr. Sheers' manipulation of the allocation of interest as part of the principal payment is
exactly what prompted Congress to implement section 483. See H.R. REP. No. 88-749
(1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1381.
94 Even though it did allow other loopholes that Mr. Sheers could have capitalized on in its
original statutory form. See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying test.
95While the fiscal object of taxation should be to collect revenue, the government must
realize that it cannot derive this kind of revenue without inevitably affecting social
relations.

EDwIN R. A. SEUGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 316 (1921).

Forcing family

members to treat each other in this cold, business-like fashion does not seem to promote
good public policy. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp.73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966)
(refusing to force parents to deal with their children at arm's length with regard to loan
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Safe Harbor Provision Enacted as Attempted Remedy

Congress eventually provided an exception to the imputed interest
rules in the case of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. 96 The
exception provided for a safe harbor interest rate that could shelter the
taxpayer from liability for a portion of the interest otherwise imputed
under the general rate. 97 A family member selling to another family
member could. then avoid imputed interest by including the safe harbor
interest rate as one of the terms of the installment sales contract. In the
case of Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers, this safe harbor would actually
protect the wrong person. Mr. Sheers, whose primary concern is to
avoid paying taxes, will reap a substantial benefit by including the safe
harbor interest rate in the installment sales contract with his daughter.98
In contrast, Mrs. Barnes, who does not want to charge her son
interest on top of the fair market value, will not receive any benefit from
the safe harbor interest rate. 99 In order to protect Mrs. Barnes from
incurring imputed income tax, Ms. Vreet begrudgingly advises Mrs.
Barnes that the installment sales contract should include interest
payments at the safe harbor rate of section 483. At this point, Ms. Vreet
could have reassured Mrs. Barnes that her son would not need to pay
excessive market interest rates. 100 Not only did the safe harbor provision

arrangements because a substantial amount of people may believe that a better source still
exists for raising taxes).
9 See the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981),
amending the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 77 to include an exception
for qualified sales.
9 Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act, the safe harbor was seven percent. Id. At this
time the Secretary raised the test rate to ten percent. Id. Thus a taxpayer involved in a
qualified sale could include a seven percent interest rate and still avoid the extra three
percent of imputed interest under the general test rate.
9 Mr. Sheers will be able to receive interest payments up to the market rate and only be
taxed on those interest payments up to the safe harbor. The remaining portion of the
payment would constitute principal and allow Mr. Sheers to receive the favorable capital
gains tax. See supra text accompanying note 71.
99 Remember that Mrs. Barnes does not want her installment sales contract to include any
interest payments. Capping the test rate for imputed interest will still result in ordinary
income tax up to the safe harbor in an installment sales contract that does not include any
interest payments. Therefore, even the section 483 safe harbor rate would force Mrs.
Barnes to pay income tax on income she did not receive. See supra text accompanying notes
94-95.
100At times the prevailing market interest rate is almost twice the safe harbor rate. See
Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991) (in which the IRS used an eleven
percent interest rate to value the taxpayers intrafamilial sales contract); Schusterman v.
United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995) (in which the prevailing market interest rate was
eleven and one half percent).
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fail to remedy the legal fiction situation, the safe harbor also failed to
address the other problems that the original enactment of section 483
created.
c)

Additional Problems Under Section 483

The legal fiction was only one of the problems that surfaced under
the original provisions of section 483. This section did not accurately
account for the appropriate time value of money in installment sales
situations 10 1 This discrepancy resulted from the use of an inflexible, flat
rate to determine the amount that the seller should have allocated to
interest payments. 10 2 With dramatic market fluctuations in real estate in
the late 1970's and early 1980's,103 the fixed test rate did not accurately
reflect the prevailing market interest rate needed to prevent an
investment loss.104 In addition, section 483 only imputed interest onto
installment sales, but not onto any other type of deferred payment
plans10 5 Finally, section 483 created loopholes for the sophisticated
taxpayer by failing to require the same accounting method to be used
when figuring the tax on an installment sales contract.1°6 These
problems warranted a remedy more drastic than a simple amendment to
section 483.
101Walsh, supra note 61, at 33-3 (commenting that the use of a simple rate of interest as the
test rate ignored the economic reality of interest compounding on unpaid interest, a
fundamental time value concept).
102 Id. See also Slagle, supra note 17, at 35 (noting that if the IRC is to reflect the economic
realities of the marketplace, without distortion resulting from the artificial rates and
computations, the reporting and interest requirements should resemble interest rates in the
financial market place).
103Judge Henley commented about this fluctuation in his concurring opinion in Krabbenhoft,
939 F.2d at 534.
104 Congress reveals an intent to keep the regular test rate in step with the prevailing
market rates by expressing a belief that the Secretary of the Treasury would establish a test
rate which reflected the market rates. HousE REPORT No. 88-749, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1381. During periods of high fluctuation, a fixed rate on a debt
instrument is impractical because it will not reflect the accurate time value of money. Thus
the rate must be allowed to change regularly to meet the rapid change in the marketplace.
See infra notes 109-112 for congressional attempts to reevaluate the test rate frequently
enough
to reflect market rates.
10
5 See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 23-1, 23-3 (1985). This caused a problem because deferred
payment for services, the use of property, or other non-sale situations still remained
immune to imputed interest payments. Id. See also Bairey & Terry, supra note 54, at 13-1,
13-2, 13-3 (1987) (outlining the different situations in which an employer compensates an
employee through deferred payments that result in certain tax advantages).
106 Walsh, supra note 61, at 33-3 (recognizing that the gaps in the original section 483
resulted in a loophole in which an accrual method buyer and a cash method seller could
structure a transaction so that the buyer could claim a current interest deduction, but the
seller was not required to report interest income currently).
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Section 1274: The New Imputed Interest Rules

Attempting to remedy the problems created under the original
enactment of section 483, Congress amended the imputation of interest
in seller-financed debt instruments by instituting section 1274.107 Under
section 1274,108 the IRS could still impute interest if the deferred payment
plan included an unstated amount of interest. 1° 9 However, section 1274
liberated the test rate from its formerly static position.11 0 Section 1274
defined the test rate as the applicable federal rate, which required a new
calculation every month."' The applicable federal rate under section
1274 stays much closer to the actual market rate than the original test
rate under section 483 did.11 2 At the same time, Congress amended the
test rate under section 483 to be the same as the applicable federal rate
found under section 1274.113 Thus, section 483 became more sensitive to
the market time value of money as a result of the 1984 amendments.
The enactment of section 1274 substantially reduced the
applicability of section 483.114
Section 483 only applied to those
installment sales contracts that did not fit under section 1274.115 One of
the key exceptions under section 1274 lies in the area of qualified sales.11 6
In other words, qualified sales are not subject to the requirements
imposed on other installment sales contracts.11 7

107See H.R. REP. No. 98-432 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 905-07 (discussing the
problems with the imputed interest rules under section 483, and how the new provision
will remedy those problems).
108For the original text of 26 U.S.C. § 1274 (1994) see The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 538.
10926 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(1994).
11026 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1994).
M 26 U.S C. § 1274(d)(1)(B)(1994).
112See Walsh, supra note 61, at 33-5 (commenting that Congress enacted 1274 to conform the
tax consequences of seller-financed sales of property more clearly to economic reality).
113See EUSTICE, supra note 38, at 2-20. See The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 553 for the original amendment.
114See Harris, supra note 85, at 228 (noting that section 1274 has largely replaced section 483
as the source of imputed interest rule for installment contracts, because after the 1984
amendments, section 483 only applies to those installment sales contracts falling within one
of the exceptions to section 1274).
115See Walsh, supranote 61, at 33-12 (stating that section 483 will apply to most situations in
which section 1274 will not apply).
11626 U.S.C. § 1274(c)(3)(F) (1994). For other exceptions see generally 26 U.S.C. § 1274(c)(3).
11726 U.S.C. § 483(e) defines a qualified sale. See supra note 24.
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Among these sweeping changes to the imputed interest rules,
Congress did not alter the safe harbor rate itself.11 8 By leaving the
qualified sale exception and the safe harbor rate undisturbed, Congress
unequivocally manifests an intent to grant favorable tax treatment to
intrafamilial installment sales in the context of imputed interest.11 9 At
times, members of Congress have zealously expressed sentiments of
preserving this safe harbor rate for family sales. 120 In the gift taxation
arena this intent is not as clear.

Its See Benjamin, supra note 19, at 703 (pointing out that Congress in fact retained the lower
safe harbor rate for intrafamilial installment sales contracts even when the Secretary of the
Treasury raised the test rate for regular installment sales contracts).
19 All three circuits agree that the safe harbor provisions reflect this policy. See Ballard v.
Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1988); Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d
529,532-33 (8th Cir. 1991); Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 1995).
120 In 1981, the IRS wanted to increase the test rate to ten percent under section 483.
However, Senators Melcher, Boschwitz, Grassley, and Jespen worked out a compromise so
that the test rate would not govern intrafamilial installment sales contracts. See 127 CONG.
REC. S17, 806 (daily ed. July 28, 1981) (statements of Sen. Mechler, Boschwilz, Grassley,
Jespen). The following quotes reveal that these Senators demanded a separate rate for
intrafamilial installment sales contracts, because they believed that the IRS should not
interfere with the affairs of those who are trying to pass on a business or farm from one
generation to the next: "Personally, I believe that the Internal Revenue Service gets into too
much of the ordinary daily lives of people....flIt is vitally important that we hold these
[imputed interest] rates down, particularly in the sale of family farms, and small
businesses." Id. at S17,805 (statement of Sen. Mechler) (brackets added); "This amendment
[inclusion of a safe harbor] is a reasonable compromise to relieve the burdens the
regulations impose on family farms and small businesses.... [T]he small businessman will
be able to sell the stock of his company, and the farmer will be able to sell his land, without
undue meddling by the IRS." Id. at S17, 806 (statement of Sen. Boschwitz) (brackets
added);
One of the tools for accessibility of younger generations to continue the
family farming operation has been the lower rate of interest that
mothers and fathers have been willing to give to their sons and
daughters in helping to start this family farm operation or small
business. This intergenerational loan or gift is not ever in the vein of
trying to avoid taxes or ever in the vein of trying to pull something fast
on the Government. This is a very open approach of one generation
willing to forgo some income just because of the desire to see the
family farm continue within the family from on generation to another.
This [the safe harbor rate] will eliminate one impediment to this
transfer of property from one generation to the other.
Id. (statement of Sen. Grassley) (brackets added);
The most important reasons against raising the imputed interest rates
are not the law or statistics but people... I am talking about men and
women with calloused hands and sore backs - the individuals who
produce our food and the entrepreneurs who take a dream and
through years of hard work turn that dream into a business ....Why
do these men and women... labor so hard? ...They do so in order to

give their offspring a better life than they had and to leave them
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Gift Taxation of Installment Sales Contracts

The gift taxation of installment sales contracts has developed
without the drastic upheaval that occurred in the area of income
taxation. Under the 1976 amendments to the gift tax, section 2512
originally valued installment sales contracts for gift tax purposes.
However, a string of cases refused to allow gift taxation to attach to any
interest-free loan arrangement, including interest-free loans between
family members. After the United States Supreme Court ended this
trend, Congress enacted section 7872 to handle the taxation of
installment sales contracts that include below-market interest rates. This
section discusses the gift taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts from section 2512 to section 7872.
1.

Background Information on Gift Taxation

Unlike income tax, 121 gift tax raises revenue from gratuitous
transfers of wealth.122 Congress designed the original gift tax to achieve
a two-fold purpose. 123 First, the gift tax safeguarded the evasion of estate
taxes, 124 because it prevented taxpayers from making inter vivos transfers

something which they in turn will pass on to their children. The new
regulations [increasing the test rate] issued by the Treasury strike at
the very heart of this venerable tradition.. . The IRS is venturing
where they have absolutely no business to be. This is Government at
its worst. While this amendment [the safe harbor rate] does not solve
all the problems of retaining family farms and family business, it is a
major step in the right direction.
Id. (statement of Sen. Jespen) (brackets added). For further comment on these Senators'
statements, see also Benjamin, supra note 19, at 699,700.
121
Income tax raises revenue from the increase in net worth, which is not a transfer of but
an accession to wealth. See McDANIEL ET AL., supranote 6, at 69 (providing the theoretical
and ubiquitous Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income). See also 26 U.S.C. § 61, 63 (1994)
(which does not provide a definition of income, but does impose a tax on sources that
increase an individual's net worth).
'2 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1994) provides that "A tax... is hereby imposed for each calendar
year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual
resident or nonresident" (italics added). Although section 2501(a)(1) uses the word
"property," commentators historically consider the gift tax a transfer of wealth. See
BIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 120-1-3 (2d ed. 1993) (lumping gift taxes into the
historical discussion of federal taxes on transfers of wealth).
123Congress first enacted a gift tax in 1924, which was repealed the following year. See
BITTKER & LOKKEN,supra note 7, at 120-2. In 1932, Congress reimposed the gift tax and,
with amendments, the gift tax has remained in force to this day. Id. The two-fold purpose
of the gift tax is noted at FREDERICK J. GERHART, THE GIFr TAX 2 (1980).
12426 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1994) imposes a tax on the transfer of the taxable estate of every
decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.
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of their entire estates before their deaths. 12s The gift tax did not actually
facilitate this purpose effectively until its amendment in 1976.126 Second,
the gift tax supplemented the income tax system by subjecting property
transferred to others to an excise tax, 127 allowing the IRS to recover the
donor's loss of income on the transfer.128
For the purpose of assessing a tax the IRC defines a gift broadly. It
imposes a tax on the "transfer of property,"12 9 not on the presence of the
strict common law elements of an inter vivos gift. 13° Because the IRC
incorporates this broad definition of "gift," the gift tax reaches into a

125 See

GERHART, supra note 123, at 2, citing Sanford Estate's v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39,
44 (1939). Essentially, the federal government did not want to allow people to simply give
away all of their possessions in an effort to deplete their estate and thereby avoid estate
taxation.
126 The 1932 enactment taxed gifts on a cumulative basis over the course of a person's entire
life.

See BARRY M. NUDELMAN & MAX E. BLUMENTHAL, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES,

GIFTS, AND TRUsTS 423 (5th ed. 1995). In addition, the 1932 gift tax was separate from the
estate tax, imposing each gift tax under a different rate system. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 7, at 120-2. The 1976 amendment "unified" the gift and estate tax systems. BITrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 120-2. This accomplished three things: (1) the application of the
same rates to both taxes; (2) the aggregation of gifts with the taxable estate for the purpose
of computing estate taxes; and (3) the unified credit applied to both gift and estate taxes.
See NUDELMAN & BLUMENTHAL, supra this footnote, at 423. For the text of the amendments
that unified the rates used for estate and gift taxes see Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1805; Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1849.
127 An excise tax is defined as "a tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods or on the
carrying on of an occupation or activity, or a tax on the transfer of property... the term has
been extended to include various license fees and practically every internal revenue tax
except the income tax." JOSEPH R. NOLAN ET AL, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 363 (6th ed.
1990).
128
See GERHART, supra note 123, at 2. Generally a taxpayer gives gifts to someone who is in
a lower tax bracket. If the gift is property that generates income for its owner, such as an
apartment complex, that income will be taxed at the lower rate of the donee rather than the
higher rate of the donor. This results in a loss of revenue for the federal government. The
gift tax helps to compensate this loss of revenue.
129 Note that the actual language of 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1)(1994) reads "a tax... is hereby
imposed for each calendar year on the transferof property by gift during such calendar year"
(Italics added).
130 The common law elements of a gift are donative intent, delivery, and acceptance. See
Pierce v. Rummell, 535 So.2d 594,598 (Ala. 1988); Gussin v. Gussin, 836 P.2d 484,494 (Haw.
1992); Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957,962 (Me. 1996); Schuldies v. Millar, 555 N.W.2d
90, 97 (S.D. 1996); Lewis v. Poduska, 481 N.W.2d 898, 899 (Neb. 1992). See also JOHN E.
CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 153 (3d ed. 1989).
Because the IRC does not define "gift" as strictly as the common law, the determination of
whether the donor made a gift turns more on the transfer of the property without adequate
and full compensation, rather than the intent of the transferor.
NUDELMAN &
BLUMENTHAL, supranote 126, at 427.
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considerable number of transactions,1 31 provided that these transactions
exceed the annual exclusion 132 and the unified credit. 133

This language includes an overwhelming bulk of gifts, some of which involve straight
forward transactions, such as delivery of deed, the creation of trust, and the physical
transfer of tangible assets, and other more subtle transfers which include canceling a debt,
deliberately allowing the statutes of limitations to run on enforcement of a debt, and
permitting a valuable right to lapse. See BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 121-9.
132 Taxpayers are allowed to "give" up to $10,000 per year to any person without incurring
gift tax liability. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (1994). Because the annual exclusion does not
carryback or carryover beyond the calendar year in which the taxpayer made the gift,
taxpayers have incentive to transfer gifts through installments rather than one lump sum.
See BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 124-2. Some authority has allowed the annual
exclusion to apply to each annually forgiven payment under an installment sales contract.
See Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 321,325 (1974) (holding that forgiving annual
payments under an enforceable installment sales contract qualified for the annual
exclusion, even though the forgiveness of each payment constituted only partial
forgiveness of the entire debt); Haygood v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 936, 943 (1964) (holding
that forgiving separately enforceable notes on the same debt constituted separate gifts that
could qualify for the annual exclusion). In Kelley and Haygood, the Tax Court held that two
family members had created a bona fide sale of property, even though the facts of each case
strongly suggested that the seller intended to forgive the buyer's payments. Id. These
decisions have been criticized by other courts that have held that an installment sales
contract between family members does not effect a bona fide sale when an intent to forgive
the payments exists. See Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591, 596-97 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that an installment sales contract between family members in which the
seller prearranged to forgive the buyer's payments constituted a gift, rather than a bona
fide sale, of property); Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657, 664 (1995)
(holding that a son and father did not enter into a bona fide sale when a son's unsecured
demand note would be forgiven upon the father's death, because this arrangement
manifested an intent to forgive the payments). Furthermore, the IRS explicitly rejected the
holdings of Kelley and Haygood. See Rev. Rul. 77-299 (1977) (in which the IRS stated that
even though the notes may have been legally enforceable, the intent to forgive the
payments revealed that the transaction was in substance a disguised gift, rather than bona
fide sale). Because of the IRS's position after Kelley and Haygood, taxpayers who forgive a
family member's payments on an installment sales contract and claim the annual exclusion
should plan on a legal battle with the IRS. For discussion of this point as it relates to the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, see infra note 148 and accompanying
text.
133 In addition to the annual exclusion, taxpayers also receive a unified credit against gift
tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 2505(a) (1994). Currently, the unified credit is $192,800. See 26 U.S.C. §
2505(a)(1) (1994). Under the "unified" transfer tax system of 1976, gifts amounting to
roughly $600,000 incur gift tax liability of $192,800. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (c)(1) (1994). Thus,
taxpayers can give up to $600,000, and the unified credit will protect them from gift tax.
However, using the unified credit for inter vivos transfers creates potentially undesirable
estate tax consequences. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 562-65 (1997). Taxpayers receive a unified credit against estate tax
equal to the amount they receive for gift tax. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1994). Estate tax
is reduced by "the aggregate amount of tax which would have been payable ... with
respect to gifts made by the decedent." See 26 U.S.C. §2001(b)(2) (1994). The word
"payable" is significant. KAHN ET AL., supra this footnote, at 565. When taxpayers make
131
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2.

Valuation Standard for Transactions Subject to Gift Tax

Section 2512 handles the valuation of transactions subject to gift tax.
The following portion addresses how section 2512 values transactions
pertaining to the disposition of real property. Next comes the valuation
of installment sales contracts under section 2512.
a)

Gift Tax Valuation of Dispositions with Real Property

One of the transactions subject to gift tax pertains to the disposition
of real property. 13 When a mother gives forty acres of land to her
daughter, the transfer of the forty acres constitutes a taxable gift. 135 The
question then becomes how much gift tax the mother needs to pay. If
she gives the property away and receives nothing in return, she will be
liable for a gift tax on the fair market value of the property. 136 If the
mother exchanges her forty acres for her daughter's twenty acres, then
the determination of gift tax liability becomes more complicated. Still
the mother receives less than she surrendered in the exchange. 137 Under
the statutory language, the mother does not receive "adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth" for the forty acres she gives
to her daughter.se The amount of the mother's gift tax then becomes the
difference between the property value she surrendered and the property
value she received. 139
This somewhat straight-forward valuation
gifts for less than $600,000, the gift tax incurred on those gifts would not be payable and
therefore is included in estate tax. Id. The amount of gift tax liability that taxpayers do not
need to pay during their lifetimes must be paid by their estate at death. Id. Essentially,

when taxpayers make gifts above the annual exclusion, they exhaust the amount of the
unified credit that their estates could use against gift taxes, whether or not taxpayers
actually claim the unified credit against gift taxes. Id. Thus, inter vivos transfers above the
annual exclusion create a "use it or lose it" situation that ultimately depletes the
testamentary unified credit. Id. This "use it or lose it" situation would deter wealthy
taxpayers involved in intrafamilial installment sales contracts from using their unified
credit against any gift tax incurred on an installment sales contract that includes only the
safe harbor interest rate. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
13 This is not surprising since 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1994) specifically imposes a tax on a
transfer of "property."
135 To determine gift tax liability, the IRS applies the appropriate tax rate against the value
of the taxpayer's gift. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2501, 2502. When a taxpayer gives away property,
the IRS must determine the value of the property before they can properly assess gift tax
liability. Section 2512 handles the valuation of property for gift tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 2512 (1994).
13 26 U.S.C. § 2512(a) (1994).
13 This hypothetical assumes that one acre of the mother's property has the same value as
one acre of her daughter's property.
138 The fair market value is the equivalent of full and adequate compensation under 26
U.S.C. § 2512(b) (1994).
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standard can become more involved when it is applied to installment
sales contracts.
b)

Gift Tax Valuation of Installment Sales Contracts

Adding another layer of complexity, gift tax liability may also exist
in the context of an installment sale of real property. 140 If a person
transfers property in exchange for a loan arrangement consisting of a
series of payments, the transferor will suffer gift tax liability if the loan
payments amount to less than the property value.141 The determination
of the value of the loan payments implicates the time value of money. 142
More specifically, the value of the installment sales contract depends on
the terms that require interest and allocate a certain portion of each
payment as this interest. 143
To illustrate the valuation of an installment sales contract, recall
Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers. If Mrs. Barnes sells her farm for $150,000 to
her son in exchange for a series of payments totaling $150,000,144 and if
the installment contract does not include any interest payments, Mrs.
14
Barnes will give the farm to her son for less than its fair market value. "
This sale subjects Mrs. Barnes to gift tax liability in an amount equal to
the difference between $150,000 and the present value of an interest-free
loan arrangement having a face value of $150,000.146 Mr. Sheers, who
intends to surreptitiously include the prevailing market interest rate in
his installment sales contract, would not incur gift tax liability. His
disguised inclusion of the prevailing market rate would make the

13 Id. The exchange does not need to be for similar property to incur gift tax liability. The
statutory language that states "where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth," indicates that the daughter does not need
to exchange similar property than her mother to incur gift tax liability. Id. The daughter
could pay cash, bonds, newspaper, or chickens for the forty acres, and so long as whatever
the daughter paid was worth less than the forty acres, her mother would incur gift tax
liability to the extent of the difference in value between what the daughter paid and what
the mother gave away.
140 See supranotes 14-19 and accompanying text.
141See GERHART, supra note 123, at 89.
4 See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
143See GERHART, supra note

123, at 90.

$150,000 is the undisputed fair market value of the farmland. See supra section I.
145Payments over time are inevitably less than full payment in the future. This means that
an arrangement to pay $150,000 over time is not worth the immediate payment of $150,000
unless the deferred payment arrangement compensates the investment loss with interest.
See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
146Exactly what the present value of an interest-free loan arrangement totaling $150,000 on
its face is can be determined using a mathematical formula. See supra note 45.
14
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present value of the installment sales contract equal to $100,000.147 Mrs.

Barnes cannot catch a break. 148 However, the courts did at one time
carve a temporary exception to the gift tax valuation of interest-free
loans that would have benefited Mrs. Barnes.
3.

Prudential Exception for Interest-Free Loans

For a number of years, the United States Court of Appeals and the
Tax Court refused to impose gift tax liability on a party to an interest-free
loan arrangement. 149 In particular, these courts refused to find gift tax
lose any money when selling the barber
shop to his daughter. See supra section I. Therefore, Mr. Sheers would make sure that
however the terms of the installment sales contract with his daughter characterized
147Remember that Mr. Sheers does not want to

principal or interest payments, he would still receive the proper time value of $100,000.
Whether Mr. Sheers' installment sales contract states it or not, it will still include interest
payments, whereas Mrs. Barnes would neither state nor include interest payments in her
installment sales contract with her son. But see infra note 274.
148 Mrs. Barnes could try to avoid gift tax by structuring the installment sales contract so
that the annual interest payments are less than the annual exclusion. She could then
forgive her son's interest payments each time they came due. However, the IRS frowns
upon this tactic, considering this kind of arrangement between family members to be a gift
rather than a bona fide sale. See supra note 132. Thus, the IRS would send Mrs. Barnes a
deficiency notice for gift tax on the forgiven interest payments, and because Mrs. Barnes
could not afford to prove to a court that her installment sales contract with her son effected
a bona fide sale, Mrs. Barnes would end up being subject to gift tax liability anyway. The
unified credit would actually allow Mrs. Barnes to avoid paying the gift tax. 26 U.S.C. §
2505. However, Mrs. Barnes would deplete her testamentary unified credit. See supra, note
133. Thus, the unpaid gift tax liability that Mrs. Barnes incurred on her installment sales
contract with her son would reduce the amount of unified credit available to her estate to
apply against her estate taxes. Because Mrs. Barnes will probably pass away without an
estate large enough to need the full unified credit, spending some of her unified credit
during her lifetime would probably not cause a serious problem. However, if Mrs. Barnes
were wealthy, spending this unified credit before death would limit the protection she
could provide for her estate. In other words, wealthy taxpayers would pay the gift tax
through their estate, rather than the year after making the gift. Thus, the unified credit may
allow Mrs. Barnes to escape paying gift tax on her installment sales contract with her son.
However, if Mr. Sheers, whose estate will be able to use the entire unified credit, includes
only the safe harbor interest rate in his installment sales contract with his daughter, his
estate will end up paying the gift tax liability he would incur. Therefore, the unified credit
does not protect all parties who include only the safe harbor interest rate in their
intrafamilial installment sales contracts. As a result, the gift tax trap can only receive its
remedy through the alteration of the provisions that create this trap, namely sections 483,
1274, 2512, 7872.
149 See Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding once again that
interest-free loans do not result in tax consequences); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d
123, 125 (9th Cir. 1982) (deferring to the holding in Dean); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
1083 (1961) (although this holding was primarily concerned with the potential income tax
implications of an interest-free loan, the court still concluded that the taxpayers had
realized no tax consequences attributable to the free use of borrowed money).
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liability on a party to an interest-free intrafamilial installment sales
contract. 150 However, the United States Supreme Court held that the
interest-free loan of funds constituted a taxable gift under the IRC.151
This decision supplanted more than two decades of case law' 52 and
stirred up a great deal of criticism.15 3 Congress reacted to this decision
by adding section 7872 to the IRC. 15 4
4.

Section 7872: Another Gift
Installment Sales Contracts

Tax Valuation

Standard

for

In addition to the valuation standard in section 2512, section 7872
also prescribes gift tax treatment for loans with below-market interest
rates.5 5 Under this section, any loan that does not include interest
payments equivalent to the applicable federal rate is deemed to make a
taxable gift. l5 6 The amount of the taxable gift equals either the forgone
interest or the amount loaned over the sum of the present value of all
payments that the terms of the loan require. 157 However, section 7872
retains an exception for contracts to which the safe harbor provision
See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (holding that taxpayers
did not make a taxable gift to their children for allowing their children to repay loaned
money without any interest); Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1064 (1977) (holding
that an interest-free loan between family members bears neither income nor gift tax
consequences).
151Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330,338 (1983).
152The first of these cases, Dean v. Commissioner, supra note 149, was decided in 1961. The
last of these cases, Hardeev. United States, supra note 149, was decided in 1983.
153 See generally Beverly McDonel, Dickman and Code Section 7872: The Death Knell to Interestfree and Below-Interest Loans, 19 AKRON L. REV. 703 (1986); Barry R Senterfitt, Below-market
lntrafamily Loans - The Recognition of UnrealizedEarnings and Accumulations of Wealth: I.R.C.
Section 7872 and Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S.Ct. 1086 (1984), 16 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 599
(1985); William T. Sharpe, Interest-free Demand Loans Now Subject to Gift Tax: Dickman v.
Commissioner,_ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984), 7 CAMPELL L. REV. 217 (1984); David Vetter,
Case Comment, Gift Taxation: Interest-free Demand Loans - Gift or Equivalent Exchange?, 35 U.
FLA. L. REv. 549 (1983).
154For the original text see Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 699.
'5526 U.S.C. § 7872 (1994). It should be noted that some cases have used section 2512 to
handle loan arrangements that use below-market rates. See Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner,
939 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1991); Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 991 (10th Cir.
15

1995).

26 U.S.C. § 7872(a), (b), (e).
15726 U.S.C. § 7872(a) (treatment of gift loans and demand loans). 26 U.S.C. § 7872(e)(2)(A)
and (B) define forgone interest as the amount of interest that would have been payable on
the loan for the period if interest accrued on the loan at the applicable federal rate and were
payable annually over any interest payable on the loan properly allocable to such period.
26 U.S.C. § 7872(b) (treatment of other below-market loans). In the case of any belowmarket loan that is not a gift or demand loan, the lender gives away the amount loaned
over the present value of all payments that are required to be made under the terms of the
loan.
156
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applies.1m Despite the explicit language of section 7872, the courts have
not applied the gift tax provisions against the safe harbor rate
uniformly. 5 9 In addition, sometimes courts will avoid the application of
section 7872 completely and rely solely on section 2512 to attach gift tax
to an intrafamilial installment sales contract. 16°
These different
applications of the gift tax to intrafamilial installment sales contracts
result from the lack of exclusory language in the text of section 483
itself. 61 The next section demonstrates how the Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits and the Tax Court have applied the gift tax statutes to the
safe harbor provision differently.
IV. TREATMENT OF INTRAFAMILIAL INSTALLMENT SALES BY COURTS

Although Congress intended to remedy the loopholes created by the
inaccurate time value taxation of installment sales contracts, 162 the
application of sections 483, 1274, 2512, and 7872 actually created havoc in
the taxation of qualified sales. 163 Federal courts have not ruled
consistently regarding the reach of the safe harbor rate. 164 The Seventh
Circuit has allowed the safe harbor rate to cap the amount of interest the
IRS may use to compute gift tax liability on an intrafamilial installment
sales contract. 165 Alternatively, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the
Tax Court have limited the safe harbor rate to the computation of
imputed interest income only. 166 These different applications have

15 26 U.S.C. § 7872(0(8).
159In Ballard v. Commissioner and Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits did not discuss section 7872 at all. The Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit applied
section 7872 against the safe harbor provisions differently in Frazee v. Commissioner and
Schustermanv. United States. See infra section IV.
160See infra notes 191,229 and accompanying text.
161The best remedy for the conflict surrounding the current taxation of intrafamilial
installment sales contracts would be exclusory language found in section 483 itself. For
further discussion see infra notes 181-182, 221, 229 and accompanying text.
162
See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
163The inconsistent application of the safe harbor as protection from income and gift tax
disrupts the continuity of law, an essential attribute of a legal system. GUIDO CALABRESi, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTEs 3 (1982).
164
However, a trend limiting the safe harbor provisions under section 483(e) has certainly
developed in the latter cases which address this issue. See Schusterman v. United States, 63
F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991); Frazee
v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 234-35.
165Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
166
Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner,
939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991); Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992); Ballard v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987) rev 'd by Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1988).
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caused significant problems in this area of taxation. 167 This section
analyzes the cases that have created this conflict, assessing the strengths
and weaknesses of their holdings.
A.

6
Ballard v. Commissioner'

After the United States Supreme Court held that an interest-free
loan resulted in gift tax liability,169 federal courts needed to determine if
a taxpayer could rely on the section 483 safe harbor rate for the purposes
of gift valuation under sections 2512 or 7872 as well as the imputation of
interest under section 1274.170 Ballard v. Commissioner171 was the first case
to address this issue. The taxpayer, Eleanor M. Ballard, entered into an
installment sales contract with her three children. 172 She sold her
children 286 acres of land for a series of annual payments that included a
principal of $386,000 plus interest at a six percent rate."13 The fair market
value of the property was $572,000.174 The taxpayer reported a taxable
gift of $186,000, determined by subtracting the contract price of the
property ($386,000) from its fair market value ($572,000).17 5 However,

167See

infra section V.A.

1M53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987), rev'd by Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.

1988).
9

16 Dickman v. Commissioner 465 U.S. 330 (1983).
170 See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. at 338. Although this Note limits its discussion
to the effect of Dickman and the subsequent enactment of section 7872 on intrafamilial sales
contracts, Dickman actually fomented many other issues for tax planners to cope with. See
McDonel, supra note 153, at 713 (recognizing that because gift loans had been used as a tax
planning device ever since Congress passed the revenue acts, tax planners needed to use
different methods of shifting their client's income); Senterfitt, supra note 153, at 616 (now
that intrafamily loans are no longer [after Dickman] valid tax avoidance devices, intrafamily
lenders must face several decisions regarding their past and future arrangements).
M 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987), rev 'd by Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1988).
172Id.
173Although the figures stated above are complete enough to understand the holding, the

terms of the Ballard's contract actually employed a more elaborate repayment schedule.
First the children needed to pay $1,000 at the execution of the contract. Id. at 324. During
the first five years of the contract, the children were to pay interest only, with each
payment due on the date one year after the date of the contract's execution. Id. After this
period, the children needed to pay a sum of principal and interest until they paid off the
remainder of the purchase price plus interest. Id. According to these terms, the children
would not pay the full purchase price until the year 2026. Id.
174The taxpayers original tax form listed the price of the property as $570,000. Id. at 323.
However, both the IRS and the taxpayer stipulated that the actual price for the property
was $572,000. Id. at 324.
175Id.
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the IRS discounted 76 the contract price using an 18 percent interest rate
that reduced the total purchase price to $13 4 ,2 9 8.2 6 .177 The amount of
the gift subject to taxation then became $437,701.74, a full $253,701.74
more than the taxpayer had figured. 178 The taxpayer contested the IRS's
discount on the grounds that her compliance with the section 483 six
percent safe harbor rate did not subject her to gift tax consequences. 179
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not rely on the section
483 six percent interest rate to value the sale price of the property. 18° The
Tax Court reasoned that-when a party does not sell property for the
value at which it would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, that party has made a taxable gift.181 Because a willing
buyer and seller would not have exchanged the property under the
terms of the installment sales contract, the taxpayer made a gift to her
children. 182 The Tax Court pointed out that Blackburn v. Commissioner'83
had already established the willing buyer and seller standard for gift tax
valuation.1 84 Although the taxpayer argued that Blackburn was decided
before the enactment of section 483, the Tax Court reasoned that nothing
in the legislative history of section 483 demonstrated a congressional
intent to change the standard of gift tax valuation instituted in
Blackburn.10
176 The IRS discounts a loan arrangement by finding the difference between the stated

redemption price of the obligation at maturity and the price for which it was initially
issued. Rick J. Taylor & William A. Raabe, OriginalIssue Discount After the Tax Reform Act of
1984, 63 TAxEs: THE TAX MAGAZINE 587, 588 (1985). That difference represents additional
interest that the obligator should have been required to pay for the use of the borrowed

funds. Id.
177Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M (CCH) at 324.
178
Id.
'7 Id. at 325.
180
Id. at 327.
181Id.

at 326. The Tax court relied on section 2512, stating that the contract was made before
section 7872 existed. Id. at 327. The Tax Court's language reflected a reliance on the
ordinary business test. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. at 303,306 (1994).
182 Another way to state the problem would be to say that the taxpayer did not receive
"adequate and full" compensation for her property as section 2512 requires. Ballard v.
Commissioner, 53 T.M.C. (CCH) 323 (1987).
1 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
184 Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 326.
195This argument is specious. Actually, the legislative history suggests neither an intent to
alter nor to maintain the gift tax valuation standards with the enactment of the safe harbor
interest rate of section 483. The Seventh Circuit noted this legislative silence and arrived at
an opposite holding. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Tax
Court hinted that section 7872 would have controlled in this case had the taxpayer entered
the installment sales contract later. Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 324. In
that scenario, Congress would show an intent to extend the safe harbor into the gift tax
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit overruled the Tax Court, finding that
the taxpayer's compliance with the section 483 safe harbor interest rate
protected her from gift tax consequences. 18 6 The Seventh Circuit arrived
187
at this finding by employing plain meaning statutory interpretation.
Because section 483 began with the words, "For the purposes of this
title," 18 the court reasoned that this language meant exactly what it said;
that the taxpayer's compliance with the safe harbor insulated her from
all adverse tax consequences under Title 26.189 In addition, the Court
realized that although the legislative history of section 483 did not
manifest an intent to change the gift tax valuation standards, the
legislative history did not indicate any intent to prevent section 483 from
reaching into the gift tax arena. 19° The Seventh Circuit dismissed the
valuation standard used in Blackburn, because that case was decided
before the constraints of section 483 existed. 191 The next case to address
this issue was Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner.192
B.

Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner'9

Three years later in Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner,194 the Eighth Circuit
refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 483.195
The taxpayers, the Krabbenhofts, transferred land to their sons through a

arena, because section 7872 specifically excepts those installment contracts governed by the
safe
harbor provision. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
8
1 6 Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185,189 (7th Cir. 1988).
187 Id. For discussion of the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation, see infra
notes
324-26 and accompanying text.
188
This language still appears at the beginning of section 483. See 26 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1994).
189 Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d at 189. Title 26 is the I.R.C.
190Id. at 188. The Seventh Circuit may properly conclude that the legislative silence does
not limit the application of section 483 to the imputation of interest, because when the
legislature has remained silent on an issue, the judiciary may slip into a the role of
policymaker. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1991) (noting that although
judges might not be considered policyrnakers in the same sense as the executive or
legislature, when no statute provides a definitive text, judges must derive their opinions
from the interstices of prior opinions and a well considered judgment of what is best for the
community). Extending the safe harbor into the gift tax arena is the appropriate policy. See
infra section V.A.
191Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d at 189. Also note that the Seventh Circuit makes no
mention of section 7872 at all, implying that the courts will continue to rely on section 2512
for the taxation of intrafamilial sales contracts.
In 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991).
193Id.
194Id. This Note omits the Tax Court opinion of this case, because it mirrors most of the

arguments it raised in Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987). See Krabbenhoft
v. Commissioner,94 T.C. 887 (1990).
195Krabbenhoftv. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 533.
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contract for deed. 196 The contract provided for a purchase price of
$400,000, an interest rate of six percent, and annual payments of $29,060
for thirty years.19 Discounting the contract at the applicable federal
rate, 198 the IRS determined that the contract for deed had a present value
of $252,642.199 With $443,400 as the fair market value of the property, the
IRS determined that the taxpayers gave their sons $190,758 as a taxable
gift. 200 Like Mrs. Ballard, the Krabbenhofts argued that their compliance
with the six percent interest rate under section 483 bound the IRS to
using the safe harbor as the maximum rate for gift tax valuation
purposes.20 1 However, the Krabbenhofts did not fare as well as Mrs.
Ballard.
The Eighth Circuit refused to allow compliance with section
483(e) 202 to cap the interest rate that the IRS may use for gift tax valuation
purposes. 2 3 The court considered section 483 irrelevant to the valuation
of gifts. 204 The court held that Congress designed section 483 to prevent
taxpayers from manipulating principal and interest payments to avoid
ordinary income taxes. 20 The court reasoned that because no statutory
language or legislative history grants the safe harbor any power outside
1%6
Id. at 530.
1971Id.

198The process of discounting is described supra note 176 and accompanying text.
I99Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner,939 F.2d at 530.

20 The IRS arrived at the amount of $190,758 by subtracting the recalibrated present value

($252,642) from the fair market value ($443,400). Id.
2M

Id.

The IRS arrived at the amount of $190,758 by subtracting the recalibrated present value
($252,642) from the fair market value ($443,400). Id.
2 3
1 Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 533.
2M4
Id. While agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that the words "for the purposes of this
title" indicate that section 483 applies to the entire IRC, the Eighth Circuit refused to see
how the imputed interest rules had anything to do with gift tax valuation. Id. at 523-33.
This reasoning reflects the entrenched principle that the estate and gift tax systems should
be construed in pari materia, meaning in conjunction with each other, whereas the gift and
income tax systems should not be construed in pari materia. See Cummings v.
Commissioner, 506 F.2d, 454 (2d Cir. 1974); Early v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d
Cir. 1947); McGinnis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1870, 1873 (1993); Towe v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1424, 1426 (1992). This in pari materia principle has been
criticized. See Mark J. Wolff, Dickman Confined: The Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers of Use,
21 STESON L. REV. 509, 512 (1992) (stating that the gift tax functions as a back stop to
protect the income tax system, and they should be read in pari materia); Erwin N. Griswold,
A Planfor the Coordinationof Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Provision with Respect To Trusts and
Other Transfers, 56 HARv. L. REv. 337 (1942) (pointing out that the income and gift tax
provisions should be coordinated with each other to prevent the amendment of the income
and gift tax statutes pertaining to trusts, because these amendments create unnecessary
litigation to determine their scope).
2 Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 531.
2m
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of the imputed interest rules, the safe harbor bears no influence on the
valuation of gifts in installment sales contracts. 2°6 The court had
previously used the section 483 safe harbor rate to limit tax liability
under a different section of the IRC. 2° 7 However, the court stated that
both of these sections pertained to the income taxation of installment
sales contracts, rendering the safe harbor rate relevant only for the
determination of the income tax. 208
In a separate concurring opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Henley
expressed some reservations about the majority's holding in
Krabbenhoft. 20 9 He did not believe that Congress wanted or anticipated
the application of a gift tax to a family transaction like the one that the
Krabbenhofts constructed. 210 Judge Henley argued that the court's
technical holding implied that Congress either intended, or simply failed
to consider, the "gift tax traps" created when market rates rose above six
percent. 211 Judge Henley stated that a "gift tax trap" occurred, because
compliance with the safe harbor provision protected the taxpayer from
imputed interest income tax, but opened the taxpayer up to additional
gift tax liability. 2 12 Judge Henley attempted to console the taxpayers by
Id. at 531, 532. This court repeats the weak argument on legislative intent begun in
Ballard v. Commissioner, supra note 185 and accompanying text, and corrected in Ballard v.
Commissioner, supranote 190 and accompanying text.
" Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 532. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 767
(8th Cir. 1971) (holding that application of the section 483 safe harbor rate to section 453,
which addresses the installment basis of reporting, was proper).
Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 532-33.
209
Id. at 534.
210 Id. This hesitance concerning government involvement in intrafamily affairs is
reminiscent of Johnson v. United States and Crown v. Commissioner. See supra note 150.
211No matter whether Congress anticipated the gift tax liability or not, the gift tax should
not be imposed under Judge Henley's reasoning. Either Congress intended to create this
gift tax trap or Congress inadvertently failed to anticipate it. Either way, imposition of the
tax could promote hostility among taxpayers. If Congress did plan to create a gift tax trap,
taxpayers may begin to consider the government malicious and oppressive. ADAMS, supra
note 1, at xvii (noting that taxpayers instinctively rebel when the government levies
oppressive taxes and that these taxpayers can pose a lethal threat). However, if Congress
absent-mindedly created the gift tax trap, then taxpayers may still consider the tax too
burdensome and lose respect for the system of taxation. See LILLIAN DORIS, THE AMERICAN
WAY IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963 1, 2 (1994) (noting that self-assessment
and voluntary compliance, which are the heart and strength of any tax system, become
threatened when the public loses confidence that the tax laws are operating fairly and
impartially).
See also infra notes 279-298 and accompanying text.
2 2
Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d at 534. Judge Henley also saw another gift tax trap
relating to the timing of the valuation. Id. If an installment sales contract undergoes
valuation during a period of high interest rates, that installment sales contract must forever
carry a substantial discount, even if the market interest rates dip later. Id. This raises a
potential equal protection problem outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
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stating that the majority's holding would only affect a small percentage
of transactions occurring in the early eighties. 213 The next case to visit
this issue proved Judge Henley's consolation to be ephemeral.
214
C. Frazee v. Commissioner

After Krabbenhoft, the Tax Court followed the Eighth Circuit and
held that the safe harbor interest rate under section 483 does not apply
for the purposes of gift tax valuation.2 15 The taxpayers, Edwin and
Mabel Frazee, transferred 12.2 acres of property to their four children in
exchange for a promissory note that contained a principal sum of
$380,000 and an interest rate of seven percent. 216 The note provided for a
20-year graduated repayment schedule. 217 The IRS determined that this
promissory note constituted a below-market loan under section 7872 and
discounted this note so that the present value equaled only $260,000.218
The taxpayers argued that their compliance with the safe harbor
provisions of section 483 insulated them from any adverse tax
19
consequences. 2
Admitting that section 7872 does not cover the loans to which
section 483 applies, the Tax Court still refused to conclude that
compliance with the safe harbor rate precluded the application of gift tax
liability under section 7872. 22o The Tax Court reasoned that section 483
equal protection problems that can result from property valuation for tax purposes, see
generally Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Charleston Fed. Say. Loan Ass'n v.
Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945).
213 Id. at 535. This kind of language suggests that Judge Henley wants to distance his
personal opinion from the majority's opinion, as if he desired to disassociate himself from
the majority's ruling in this case.
21498 T.C. 554 (1992).
215Id. at 585.
2161d. at 555.

Id. at 554. The court also addressed an issue concerning the valuation of the property
itself at the time of the sale. Id. at 561.
21
8Id. at 580.
217

21

9

Id.

Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. at 554, 581 (1992). Although the Tax Court noted the
language in section 7872 that excepted those installment sales contracts to which section
483(e) applies, the Tax Court somehow concluded that section 483 does not apply in this
case and therefore the IRS was not precluded from valuing the installment sales contract
with the applicable federal rate for gift tax purposes. Id. at 581, 582. This does not make
sense. The exception in section 7872 does not require that section 483(e) apply for gift tax
purposes, only that section 483 apply in some undefined capacity. 26 U.S.C. § 7872(0(8).
Thus, because section 483 applies for income tax purposes, it does apply in some capacity
and should therefore fall into the exception found in section 7872.
220
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did not apply, because Congress only intended to enact a safe harbor for
income tax purposes, not for gift tax purposes. 221 On this point, the Tax
Court found it significant that no mention of gift taxes appeared in
section 483's legislative history.m Although the Tax Court considered
potential problems with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Ballard, 2 the
Tax Court supported its holding only with this tenuous legislative
history argument. 224 As Judge Henley may have feared, the Eighth
Circuit's holding in Krabbenhoft has begun to look like the start of a trend
toward denying taxpayers the protection of the safe harbor rate for gift
tax valuation purposes.

221 Frazee v. Commissioner 98 T.C. at 585. Frankly, the Tax Court simply misapplied
section 7872. Congress provided an exception to the taxation imposed under section 7872
for those installment sales contracts to which section 483(e) applies. 26 U.S.C. § 7872(f)(8).
Once section 483 applies to an installment sales contract, it applies for purposes of the
entire IRC. Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d at 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1988). The Eighth
Circuit, which did not directly address section 7872 in Krabbenhoft, and the Tax Court agree
that section 483 applies to the entire IRC, but only to the extent that section 483 is relevant.
Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1991); Frazee, 98 T.C. at 584.
Section 483 is in fact relevant to the application of section 7872, because if section 483
applies to an installment sales contract, the clear statutory language excludes that
installment sales contract from tax consequences under section 7872. See Stillman, supra
note 26, at 155, 158 (pointing out that statutory and regulatory language has been ignored
as taxpayers who used the income tax safe harbor rates have been hit with gift tax
consequences). To avoid this problem, Congress should include an exception within
section 483 itself. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. ,
m This argument has been tried before, and it is as weak here as it was on earlier occasions.
See supranotes 185, 190, 206 and accompanying text.
3 The Tax Court believed that following Ballard would lead to anomalous results. Frazee
v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 584 (1992). According to the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning would mean that a person could die in possession of an installment sales
contract, and the decedent's estate would need to pay an estate tax on the remaining
unpaid portion of the installment sales contract. Id. Essentially, the Tax Court is worried
that allowing section 483 to fix the face value of the installment sales contract would force
the decedent's estate to pay tax on the entire face value of the installment sales contract,
whether that face value had been fully paid or not, rather than imposing a tax on the
discounted present value of the installment sales contract at the time of death. Id. at 583.
This fear is unfounded. A skillful drafter could write in a default provision in the
installment sales contract that states that in the event of the buyer's death, if the contract
has not been paid in full, the buyer forfeits the property to the seller. Then the land will not
remain in the estate at the time of the buyer's death, which is the time that the probate
court or executor of the will must use to determine what is part of the estate. See 26 U.S.C.
§222001 (1994).
4 Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554,585 (1992).
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D. Schusterman v. United States 22
In Schusterman v. United States,226 the Tenth Circuit continued the
trend toward limiting the range of the safe harbor protection that started
in the Eighth Circuit. The taxpayers, Charles and Lynn Schusterman,
transferred 420 shares of stock to five irrevocable trusts.227 In exchange
for the stock, the trustee issued promissory notes payable to the
228
taxpayers for $7,954,046.60 in addition to a six percent interest rate.
Because the promissory notes required an interest rate lower than the
prevailing market interest rate at the time these notes were issued, the
IRS claimed that the taxpayers were liable for gift tax under section
2512. 229 The taxpayers contended that compliance with the six percent
safe harbor formed a ceiling on the rate that the IRS could use to value
their installment sales contracts. 23°
The Tenth Circuit held that the IRS was entitled to use the
prevailing market interest rate in the gift tax valuation of promissory
notes that only included the safe harbor interest rate. 231 After outlining
the debate begun in the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit aligned its
opinion with the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit and Tax Court. 232 After
curiously concluding that section 483 did not apply to the installment
sales contract at issue,2a the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that

22563 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).

Id.
Id. at 988. Although it does not concern intrafamilial installment sales of real property,
this case is significant because it reveals a trend away from special treatment for
intrafamilial installment transfers of property in general. See infra text accompanying notes
234-35.
m Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d at 988.
29 Id. at 989. Notice that the Tenth Circuit relies on section 2512 rather than section 7872 to
attach gift tax liability on this below-market loan. This raises the issue beyond a simple
misapplication of the exception in section 7872. Ultimately the circuits could use section
2512 to avoid the section 7872 exception entirely. For this reason, section 483 should
include its own exception to gift tax liability that will apply to sections 2512 and 7872 and
any other gift tax provision. See supra notes 181, 182,191,221, 229 and accompanying text.
23 Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d at 989.
2

2

231Id.

at 993.

= Id.
M Id. at 990. The Tenth Circuit engaged in a technical reading of the safe harbor provision.
Id. The Tenth Circuit claimed to glean a congressional intent to limit section 483 to the
income tax arena after an examination of how sections a), b), and c) work together. Id.
While it is true that the remedy for the IRS under section a) only refers to income tax
liability, this does not mean that Congress intended to maroon section 483 in the income
tax system. Because no other court has generated reasoning similar to the Tenth Circuit's in
this matter, this opinion really proves that the safe harbor provisions are ambiguous at
best. An ambiguous statute that provides no legislative history pertaining to the safe
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section 483's prefatory language precluded the IRS from valuing an
intrafamilial installment sales contract using the prevailing market
2
rate.3m
Therefore, while this case did not contribute much insightful
discourse pertaining to the gift tax valuation of intrafamilial installment
sales contracts, the Tenth Circuit did further a possible trend toward
limiting the scope of the safe harbor to the income tax arena.
While these latter cases may suggest a trend toward limiting the safe
harbor provision to the income tax arena, other jurisdictions that have
not ruled on the section 483 safe harbor issue could follow any of these
three circuits. 235 Inconsistency and uncertainty are repugnant to an
effective taxation system. 2m Thus, this conflict between the circuits needs
reconciliation. Next this note considers the social tax policy involved in
order to determine whether the Seventh Circuit or the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits decided the reach of the section 483 safe harbor provision
correctly.
V.

NECESSITY OF REFORM AND MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH IT

The federal government must collect taxes to maintain an ordered
society. 237 Because living in an ordered society benefits all citizens,
paying taxes should benefit the individual citizen who must pay them.238
harbor provisions certainly does not indicate a clear congressional intent to restrict the safe
harbor.
2u Id. at 993, 994.
2 Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, any circuit outside of the
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits is not bound to decide this issue either way. See PRATT,
supranote 23. In fact, one of the primary reasons the Supreme Court grants certiorari is to
resolve conflicts in the circuits. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 389 (1995); Edwards v. Home
Medical Group For Women, 215 U.S. 1303, 1303 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court will
probably not grant certiorari until a conflict in the Circuits exists on the issue); Howlett v.
Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92,95 (1994).
See GROVES, supra note 1, at 18. Notice that two of the Smith Canons require that taxes
be certain and equitable. Id. The conflict in the circuits violates both of these because it
generates uncertainty and unequal treatment of taxpayers in similarly situated positions.
See infra section V.A. See also THOMAS J. REESE, THE POLMCS OF TAXATION xii (1980)
(stating that a key principle that guides tax policymakers when they try to facilitate a tax
reform is fairness, similar tax treatment for taxpayers with similar incomes and assets,
which is the opposite of the situation currently existing in the tax law concerning the
section 483 safe harbor interest rate).
237For Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous statement, see supra note 1. A "revenue
imperative" motivates the federal tax policymakers first and foremost, because they must
plan for contingencies, primarily war, that create a colossal fiscal need for the government.
See SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAIURE OF U. S. TAX PoLIcY 2 (1996).
238See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 15, 16 (arguing that taxation can be good because it
supports the government that maintains the cooperative association between individuals
necessary for human survival). Not everyone agrees that the government collects taxes for
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However, the government's system of taxation must remain properly
organized and administered. Otherwise, tax-paying citizens will lose
faith that the government collects taxes to effectuate any social benefit. 239
A properly organized system of taxation requires both equity and
predictability. 240 Because the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts lacks these two essential elements of a properly organized and
administered tax system, 241 the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts needs reform. This section examines both the necessity and
methods of reform for the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts.
A.

The Need to Reform the Taxation of Intrafamilial Installment Sales
Contracts

A system of taxation that benefits its citizens exhibits at least two
main attributes. 242 First, the imposition of taxes should remain equitable
or fair among all citizens. 243 Second, the imposition of taxes must be
predictable or consistent.244 When a system of taxation does not effect
equity or predictability, the government and its citizens risk facing

the good of society. See ADAMS, supra note 1, at 1-3 (analogizing the tax collector to a
robber, because both take money and property, by force if necessary, without paying for it).
239DORIS, supra note 211, at 2.
240
See infra section V.A.
241
See infra notes 253-56, 263-78 and accompanying text.
242Actually, a properly organized system of taxation exhibits more than fairness and
predictability. See GROVES, supranote 1, at 18 (where the reproduced Smith Canons require
a tax system to be equitable, certain, convenient, and economic); REESE, supra note 236, at
xii (including fairness, simplicity, efficiency, and burden shifting in the system of taxation
among the policies reformers hope to promote). This Note only focuses on fairness and
predictability, because the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts is for the
most part a substantive tax law issue. Fairness and predictability are the policies that
should drive the substantive tax law. Simplicity, efficiency, convenience, and economy are
policies that should drive the procedural tax law, and thus are not as important to this
Note. For a discussion of these procedural aspects of social policy relating to taxation and
their differences from the substantive issues, see generally POLLACK, supra note 237.
243The word "fairness" will be used synonymously with the word "equity" in this Note,
because these two terms possess similar meanings in the scholarly discourse on tax policy.
See JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 83; REESE, supra note 236, at xii. Both of these authors
discuss the same concept of taxpayers sharing the societal burden equally, but while James
and Nobles call this concept tax equity, Reese calls it fairness.
244 The word "predictability" will be used synonymously with the word "consistency"' in
this Note, because these two concepts are used interchangeably in the scholarly discourse
on tax policy. See GROVES, supra note 1, at 18-9 (discussing the emphasis Adam Smith
placed on the certainty of taxes, meaning that taxes are both predictable and consistent so
that they remain clear and plain to the taxpayer). Furthermore, predictability and
consistency are naturally related concepts, because a tax is not predictable if the federal
courts do not apply the tax consistently. See infra notes 263-78 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/11

Wolma: Ambushed in a Safe Harbor: Taxation of Intrafamilial Installment

1998]

AMBUSHED INA SAFE HARBOR

349

adverse social and economic consequences. The current conflict between
the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals creates inequity and
unpredictability in the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts. This section begins by demonstrating how the current taxation
of intrafamilial installment sales contracts does not conform to important
social policy. This section also discusses the consequences that follow
when a system of taxation does not properly conform to social policy.
1. Failure to Conform with Social Policy
This section demonstrates how the current taxation of intrafamilial
sales contracts fails to exhibit the policies of equity and predictability.
The analysis of these policies and the safe harbor provision reveals that
the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts can only promote
both equity and predictability if the safe harbor provision protects
taxpayers from additional income and gift tax consequences.
a)

Unfairness of the Safe Harbor Imputed Interest Rules

Fairness is a fundamental policy consideration in taxation. 245 For a
tax system to be fair, people with similar income and assets should pay
the same amount of taxes. 246 In other words, all members of society must
equally share the monetary burden required to preserve their society.247
If taxpayers believe that the federal government does not impose taxes
fairly, they will lose respect for the system of taxation. 248 If the federal
government persists in levying unfair taxes, the taxpayers will ultimately
develop hostility toward the federal government. 249 Because the safe
out that a just system of taxation
requires that a society equitably share the burdens and benefits of social collaboration).
246Two forms of equity exist in tax policy: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity
requires similarly situated taxpayers to pay the same amount in taxes. See JAMES &
NOBLES, supra note 4, at 75. Vertical equity requires differently situated taxpayers to pay a
different amount in taxes. Id. Horizontal equity is at issue in this Note. See infra note 253
and accompanying text.
245 See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 6-9 (pointing

247STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL

41, 42 (1993) (noting the agreement between scholars that each taxpayer should
equally share the sacrifice created by the necessary tax burden).
248A general sense that a system of taxation is unfair motivates citizens to cheat on their
taxes, evidencing a lack of respect for the tax system. See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 53
(stating that the CPA institute, after a two year study, concluded that people evade paying
taxes for three basic reasons: (1) a sense that one's tax burden has risen above its fair share;
(2) erosion of public confidence that the tax law is treating everyone fairly, because the tax
regulations have become increasingly complex, and (3) a sense that tax loopholes are
unfair).
249History demonstrates that when taxpayers lose respect for a system of taxation, they
grow angry and rebel against the government imposing oppressive taxation. ADAMS, supra
DEBATES
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harbor rules are not applied equitably, the taxation of intrafamilial
installment sales contracts may be one more step toward the taxpayers
losing faith in the federal government's current system of taxation.
Mrs. Barnes' and Mr. Sheers' situations demonstrate the lack of
fairness created by the safe harbor rules. Mr. Sheers wants to include the
prevailing market interest rate in his installment sales contract with his
daughter, but he does not want to pay ordinary income tax on this
interest. Mr. Sheers can afford to gamble that he will win any litigation
the IRS may bring against him. 2s° As a result, Mr. Sheers decides that his
installment sales contract with his daughter will include only a six
percent interest rate on its face. At the same time, Mr. Sheers inflates the
sale price of the barber shop so that the principal payments will also
include the difference between six percent and the prevailing market
interest rate. This difference will then receive the special capital gains
tax treatment, while protecting Mr. Sheers from any additional gift tax. 251
Mrs. Barnes neither wants to charge her son the prevailing market
interest rate nor can she afford a court battle with the IRS. To be safe
from litigation, Mrs. Barnes must charge the prevailing market interest
rate in her installment sales contract with her son. 252 Thus, Mrs. Barnes
will need to pay ordinary income tax on the difference between the safe
harbor rate and the prevailing market rate, whereas Mr. Sheers only
needs to pay the cheaper capital gains tax on this difference. This
note 1, at xviii (where the author introduces the following as the thesis for his
approximately 500 page book. taxes played an important part in stirring insurrection in
every society from ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel to the modem world). Such hostility is
already evident in militia groups. See infra notes 289, 291 and accompanying text.
25 Of course, Mr. Sheers would like to avoid the cost of litigation as well. Granted, taking
calculated risks is part of being a good business person. Even so, the current trend of
holdings in this area suggest that Mr. Sheers should not count on this litigation as a gamble
which will pay off. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
25 1
Mr. Sheers would not incur additional gift tax under section 2512 or section 7872 because
the terms of the contract provide full and adequate compensation. The sum of the present
value of all the payments under the installment sales contract would equal the sum of the
payments which incorporate the prevailing market rate. In essence, Mr. Sheers
incorporates the prevailing market interest rate without stating the total prevailing market
interest rate on the face of the installment sales contract. Mr. Sheers then fools the gift tax
which does not pay attention to allocation of payments between interest and principal, but
to the total value given by the donor. However, the IRS may decide Mr. Sheers'
maneuvering smacks of tax evasion and choose to litigate the issue. See United States v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. at 57 (stating that the court will look to substance and not
form when determining interest rates).
252Including the prevailing market interest rate in an intrafamilial installment sales contract
is the most conservative position a taxpayer can take to avoid litigation by the IRS. See
Stillman, supra note 26, at 155.
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situation departs from equitable taxation. Both Mr. Sheers and Mrs.
Barnes are engaging in a similar installment sale, and the federal
government is not taxing them the same.3
Mr. Sheers' and Mrs. Barnes' situations also demonstrate how a
taxpayer can grow to resent a government that supports an inequitable
tax system. Mrs. Barnes could become upset with the federal tax system
for two reasons. First, Mrs. Barnes will not appreciate the federal
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, because it does not
allow her to ease her son's financial burden in the sale of the farmland. 254
Second, and more critically, the knowledge that Mr. Sheers enjoys a tax
benefit on the same sort of installment sales contract will infuriate Mrs.
Barnes. 255 Mrs. Barnes' anger at the federal government's taxation of
intrafamilial installment sales contracts could push her closer to
resenting the federal government's system of taxation as a whole, and
possibly even the federal government itself.2-6
b) Unpredictability of the Safe Harbor Imputed Interest Rules
As if this lack of equity were not bad enough, the conflict between
the Seventh Circuit and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits creates
unpredictability in the current system of taxation. This conflict
regarding the application of the safe harbor provision will also cause
2w See supra note 246.

Remember that Mrs. Barnes' son agreed to buy the farm from his mother at this time
because he realized that his mother cannot afford to keep the land herself. Mrs. Barnes
254

perceived her son's gesture to buy the farm as a favor to her, and the safe harbor rules do
not allow her to return this favor. Although this "tugs on" the heart strings, this sentiment

in itself does not render the safe harbor rules unfair. The government must impose certain
unlikeable restrictions on individuals in order to maintain the consistency of the case law
system. See Reiter v. Dyken, 290 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1980) (holding that the court could not
change its precedent on the interpretation of the comparative fault statute, even though
that precedent denied the plaintiffs the compensation they deserved for personal injuries).
Even so, explaining this to Mrs. Barnes will not make her feel any warmer toward the
federal government.
Here the classic violation of equity in the system of taxation exists: the federal
2
government is not ensuring that taxpayers in the same or similar circumstances pay the
same or similar taxes. See JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4; REESE, supra note 236. Mrs. Barnes
will be forced to pay ordinary income tax on the total prevailing market interest rate,
whereas Mr. Sheers only needs to pay ordinary interest up to the safe harbor rate. Mrs.
Barnes will realize that only reason Mr. Sheers can take advantage of this loophole instead
of her is because she cannot afford to litigate this matter while Mrs. Sheers can. Mrs.
Barnes will quickly conclude that the loophole is unfair because it favors the rich over the
poor. See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 53 (noting that one of the major problems with the
American tax system is that tax breaks such as these cause a lack of progressivity, which is
the common tool for taxing according to the ability to pay).
2 See infra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers to grumble, because the conflict introduces unpredictability
into the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts.257 Just as the
government must create a tax system that is equitable, 258 the government
must also administer that tax system with predictability. 259 Taxpayers,
both corporate and individual entities, inevitably structure their budgets
to account for the cost of tax. 26° In order for taxpayers to structure a
meaningful budget, they must be reasonably certain as to the amount
they must allot to pay taxes. For taxpayers to know how much taxes will
cost them, they must be able to predict the tax consequences that will
261
attach to their economic behavior.
For example, a corporation assembles bearings from different
components purchased from other manufacturers. The corporation
decides to expand its business. It wants to manufacture the components
of the bearings and eliminate the need to purchase them from outside
manufacturers. To support the expansion, the corporation will need to
build new plants, hire employees with different skills, and purchase
additional raw materials. All of these transactions will have tax
consequences. 262 When the corporation finally needs to decide the
economic feasibility of its proposed expansion, it must know the total
cost of the expansion. This total cost includes tax liability. Therefore, the
corporation must know its exact amount of tax liability in order to
confidently determine the feasibility of the expansion.
Only a

z7

For those under the jurisdiction of the Seventh, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits, the safe

harbor provisions application against potential gift tax would be predictable. These courts
have already ruled on this issue and are bound by that decision. See PRATr, supra note 23.
However, in the remaining eight circuits, it is not clear whether the Seventh Circuit or the
Eighth and Tenth circuit's opinions will be followed.
2"See supra section V.A.I.a.
m See Ivan Allen Co. V. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641 (1975) (the dissenting opinion
indicates that predictable and regular administration of federal taxation are considerable
virtues); Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682-87 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the taxpayer interest
in the predictability of taxation). See also John Wei-Ching Kuo, Sales/Use Taxation of
Software: An Issue of Tangibility,2 HIGH TECH. L. J.125,140 (1987) (stating predictability and
certainty
are fundamental principles of an ideal tax structure).
26
0 See SELIGMAN, supra note 95.

See Kuo, supra note 259, at 140 (pointing out that when a tax law is imprecise and
uncertain in its application, courts and taxing entities may inconsistently interpret the tax
law such that taxpayers will not know the tax consequences of an activity in advance or
that the tax consequence will differ dramatically from one area to another, which describes
the current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts perfectly).
26 26 U.S.C. §§ 301-385 handles the taxation of corporations. For discussion on the taxation
of corporations and partnerships, see generally DOUGLAS A. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE
TAXATION (3d ed. 1981 ); DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFERY S. LEHMAN, CORPORATE INCOME
TAXATION (4th ed. 1994); BERNARD WORLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (3d ed. 1990).
263
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predictable tax system can help this corporation determine the feasibility
of its endeavor.
The conflict in the circuits regarding the reach of the section 483 safe
harbor leaves the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts in a
state of unpredictability. 263 This unpredictability will irritate both the
attorneys who must advise taxpayers and the taxpayers themselves. Ms.
Vreet practices in the Sixth Circuit. 264 While the Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits have ruled on the reach of the safe harbor provision, the
Sixth Circuit has not determined this issue. 265 Because a conflict remains
between the circuits, Ms. Vreet will not be able to accurately predict
whether the Sixth Circuit will follow the Seventh Circuit or the Eighth
and Tenth Circuits and the Tax Court. 266 Ms. Vreet can only be certain
that including the safe harbor rate in an installment sales contract will
secure Mr. Sheers and Mrs. Barnes from the income taxes resulting from
267
the imputed interest provisions.

2

See supra section V.A.1.b.

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
W An attorney must be able to make reasonable predictions rather than outright guesses
with regard to tax matters because of the effect that taxes have on the whole economy. See
JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 18-43 (noting that unpredictable taxation has the following
negative effects on the economy: excess burden and increased compliance and
administration costs). Before an attorney can offer a reasonable prediction and not a guess,
the courts must interpret the same section of the IRC the same way among similar facts.
26

See CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 165 (commenting that courts which provide continuity
and change in American law must treat like cases alike). If the Seventh, the Eighth, and the

Tenth Circuits had handed down consistent rulings on the reach of the safe harbor
provision, Ms. Vreet could use the principle that the courts will treat like cases similarly to
predict that the Sixth Circuit will follow the unbinding decisions of the Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits. However, the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not treated like
cases similar with regard to the reach of the safe harbor provision. Thus, Ms. Vreet, and
anyone practicing outside the Seventh, Eighth, or Tenth Circuits, must guess rather than
predict how the Sixth Circuit would rule on the safe harbor provision. While attorneys
must deal with ambiguities in the law all the time, the economic consequences of taxation
dictate that an attorney should be able to give taxpayers more than a guess when they ask
for advice on tax matters.
26
6 The recent decisions on this issue seem to form a trend toward limiting the safe harbor
to income taxation alone. See supra text accompanying notes 234, 235. However, the fact
that two jurisdictions interpret the safe harbor provision the same way does not constitute
an entrenched trend. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning, although assaulted by the Eighth
Circuit, still remains sound enough to support a holding which would allow section 483(e)
to protect intrafamilial installment sales contracts from adverse income and gift tax
liability. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
W The Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuit all agree that the safe harbor will protect a
taxpayer from additional income tax consequences. See Schusterman v. United States, 63
F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991);
Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1988).
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However, if Ms. Vreet only includes the safe harbor interest rate in
her clients' installment sales contracts, Mrs. Barnes may or may not
suffer gift tax liability.268 If the IRS chose to litigate regarding the
installment sales contract, the Sixth Circuit could follow either the
Seventh Circuit or Eighth and Tenth Circuits. If the Sixth Circuit were to
follow the Seventh Circuit, then Mrs. Barnes would not incur additional
gift tax liability.26 9 If the Sixth Circuit were to follow the Eighth and
270
Tenth Circuits, Mrs. Barnes would suffer additional gift tax liability.
Thus, Ms. Vreet has two options. On one hand, Ms. Vreet can
advise her clients to include the prevailing market interest rate. 271 This
advice will please neither Mr. Sheers nor Mrs. Bames. 272 Otherwise, Ms.
Vreet can advise her clients to include the safe harbor rate and brace for
potential litigation. 273 In either situation, the conflict in the circuits does
not allow Ms. Vreet to accurately predict how the federal government
will tax Mrs. Barnes' and Mr. Sheers' installment sales contracts. 274 In
Remember that the nature of Mr. Sheers' installment sales contract will most likely
protect him from gift tax liability, because he would not be making a taxable gift at all. See
supra note 147 and accompanying text.
26 The Seventh Circuit held that the safe harbor provision protects a taxpayer from
additional gift tax liability. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
270 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits held that the safe harbor provision does not protect a
taxpayer from additional gift tax liability. See supra notes 203-08, 231-34 and accompanying
text.
271 Including the prevailing market rate is the most conservative, non-litigation breeding
position a taxpayer can take on the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. See
Stillman, supra note 26, at 153. Ms. Vreet would certainly advise Mrs. Barnes to include the
prevailing market interest rate in her installment sales contract, because Mrs. Barnes cannot
afford the cost of any potential litigation. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. Even
though Mr. Sheers does not really need to worry about a gift tax, whether the IRS chooses
to litigate the matter or not, Ms. Vreet should still probably advise Mr. Sheers to include the
prevailing market rate. If Mr. Sheers only states the safe harbor rate in his installment sales
contract, the IRS may notice that Mr. Sheers has not included the prevailing market rate,
sense a potential effort to evade taxes, and choose to litigate the matter anyway. Paying the
additional ordinary income on the fully stated amount of interest could easily cost less than
the court battle Mr. Sheers may need to wage against the IRS.
272 Mr. Sheers will be angry because he will have to pay an ordinary income-tax on the
higher prevailing market rate, and Mrs. Barnes will be upset because she must charge her
son a sizable interest rate which he will barely be able to afford, possibly subjecting the
property to a tax lien.
273Including the safe harbor rate alone is the most aggressive, legally defensible position a
taxpayer can take on the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. See Stillman,
supra note 26, at 157. This option is really not available for Mrs. Barnes, because she does
not have the money to pay for litigation against the IRS. See supra section I.
274Ms. Vreet may actually be able to reasonably predict the amount of taxes that the federal
government will levy against his installment sales contract. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text. However, because Mr. Sheers is obviously trying to camoflague
interest payments as principal in an effort to avoid paying ordinary income tax on that
268
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turn, neither Mrs. Barnes nor Mr. Sheers could budget for the cost of the
tax on their installment sales contracts with any degree of certainty. 275
While this lack of predictability will augment Mrs. Barnes' ill-feelings, 276
Mr. Sheers may also grow disgusted with the federal system of
taxationm because even his lawyer cannot give him a straight answer as
to how much taxes will cost him.2 8
Therefore, the current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts does not conform to the basic tax policies of equity and
predictability. Taxes that do not conform to these tax policies carry
adverse consequences that warrant a reform of the section 483 safe
harbor provision. The next section considers these consequences in
greater detail.
2.

Consequences of the Failure To Conform with Basic Tax Policy

The conflict in the circuits does not allow the current taxation of
intrafamilial installment sales contracts to remain equitable of
predictable. 279 Taxes that do not exhibit equity and predictability cause
taxpayers to develop ill-will toward the government. 280 When taxes do
not display the basic policies of equity and predictability, the
government and its citizens encounter adverse economic and social
consequences. 281

interest, the IRS may be able to convince the court that Mr. Sheers' maneuvering violates
Congress' original purpose for enacting the imputed interest rules. See supra notes 72-77
and accompanying text. Thus, the court may find that Mr. Sheers is liable for ordinary
income tax up to the prevailing market interest rate. However, this outcome is so unlikely
that Mr. Sheers really would not need to worry about it too much.
275
See supra notes 263-70, 274 and accompanying text.
276
Remember that Mrs. Barnes is already angry about the unfairness that is present in the
current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. See supra text accompanying
notes 254-55.
2 Mr. Sheers, and Mrs. Barnes for that matter, may already have a distaste for the tax
system. See REESE, supra note 236, at xii (proposing that many taxpayers perceive the
federal system of taxation as the government taking sway their hard-earned money).
vs Being a businessman, Mr. Sheers will be acutely aware of the importance of his budget.
Not knowing the exact cost of tax in this situation would undermine his attempts to
construct an accurate budget. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
279
See supra section V.A.l.a.,b.
2mSee supra notes 254-55,276-78 and accompanying text.
21 See infra section V.A.2.a.,b.
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a)

Economic Consequences of Inequitable and Unpredictable
Taxation

Every taxpayer would not react to the taxation of intrafamilial
installment sales contracts with Mr. Sheers' and Mrs. Barnes'
frustration. 2 2 Rather, some citizens will simply refuse to pay the taxes
that they perceive to be inequitable or unpredictable. 283 These taxpayer's
refusal originates with their sense of justice. 284 When taxpayers discover
unfair or unpredictable taxation, they conclude that the tax system as a
whole is unjust. 285 This sense of injustice causes taxpayers to avoid or to
286
evade paying taxes.
Tax avoidance and evasion impact the American economy
adversely. Those who refuse to pay the inequitable and unpredictable
taxes spend an increased amount of time and money trying to avoid and
to evade taxes. 28 7 Paying for the costs associated with tax avoidance and
evasion reduces the taxpayer's economic welfare. 28 Even those who do
not try to avoid or to evade taxes suffer adverse economic consequences,
289
because they end up paying the taxes that others have avoided.
Although the adverse economic impact of inequitable and unpredictable
m8 For Mrs. Barnes' and Mr. Sheers' reactions, see supra notes 254-55, 276-78 and
accompanying text.
28 This section points out that inequitable and unpredictable taxation drives taxpayers to
avoid and to evade taxes. Thus, these taxpayers do not grow mad, as Mr. Sheers and Mrs.
Barnes. Rather, they "get even" with the government that tries to impose these kinds of
taxes on them. See supra notes 280-82 and infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
28"See JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 74 (describing how the fairness and predictability of
taxes are connected to a taxpayer's sense of justice).
295 See JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 74 (noting that a society must face certain practical
problems when taxpayers begin to perceive that a system of taxation is unjust).
See JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 104 (naming inequity and imprecise laws as two of
the causes of tax avoidance and evasion). See also PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 53.
287To avoid and to evade taxes, taxpayers must pay the excessive fees of expert advisers,
and in addition, taxpayers must also rearrange their affairs according to that advice. See
JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 105.
2The efforts and resources needed to receive an expert's advice and to effect the necessary
rearrangement imposes considerable costs upon the taxpayer. See JAMES & NOBLES, supra
note 4, at 105. Paying these costs reduces the taxpayer's ability to pay for anything else.
219The federal government needs to raise a fixed amount of revenue through taxes. JAMES &
NOBLES, supra note 4, at 106. That amount does not change no matter how many citizens
pay taxes. Thus, the failure of one citizen to pay taxes increases the amount that the rest of
the citizens must pay. In a sense, taxpayers who continue to pay inequitable and
unpredictable taxes pay their own taxes plus the taxes of those who avoid or evade paying
them. JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 105.
Paying more than a fair share of taxes
obviously reduces the wealth of the taxpayer who does not avoid or evade tax liability.
These taxpayers may share Mrs. Barnes' anger toward the federal government. See supra
text accompanying notes 254-55.
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taxation causes enough trouble, a system of taxation that lacks these
policies creates negative social consequences as well.
b)

Social Consequences of Inequitable and Unpredictable
Taxation

Inequitable and unpredictable taxes, such as those governing the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, carry adverse social
consequences also. Inequitable and unpredictable taxes bring taxpayers
into conflict with the government. 29° A certain degree of tension always
exists between taxpayers and the government tax official.291 However,
the current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts
unnecessarily exacerbates tensions between the government and its
taxpayers. 292 If this kind of taxation continues, taxpayers may doubt that
the government collects taxes for any good reason.293 Eventually,
taxpayers may begin to lose respect for the government that imposes
these taxes. 294 The United States of America was born out of a
290 See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 51-3 (stating that American taxpayers are angry with
the American tax system, and that most of that anger seems to come from the perceived

unfairness of taxes).
291See ADAMS, supra note 1, at xvii (pointing out that human rights can suffer under certain

systems of taxation because the tax man takes whatever the tax man wants, including a
taxpayer's liberty, should the tax man so desire). See also Don L. Boroghs et al., A Messy
Business: Can the IRS Clean Up Its Act and Pacify the Nation'sAngry Taxpayers?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, April 8, 1996, at 38 (noting that "tax collectors have been dodging stones
ever since biblical times").
The present is not the best time to exacerbate tension between the taxpayers and federal
government. Boroghs et al., supra note 291, at 38 (noting that the chorus of voices
challenging the IRS today [1996] has risen to a pitch not heard in decades). In fact, a poll by
the Tarrance Group for the U.S. News revealed that fewer than a quarter of registered
voters said that the country would be worse off if the IRS were abolished and more than a
third thought that the abolishment of the IRS would be an improvement. Id.
293When the government does not collect taxes in a fair and equitable manner, taxpayers
will no longer believe that taxes possess their essential quality, which is the enhancement
of strength and prosperity of a people. See ADAMS, supra note 1, at xviii. Taxpayers will
then consider the tax "dumb" and naturally rebel against paying it. Id.
294That can lead to an insurrection mentality in extreme cases. See ADAMS, supra note 1, at
xvii, xviii (taxpayers may even become angry at the government tax collector under
inequitable and unpredictable circumstances, posing a potential threat of rebellion against
the government). See also Christopher John Farley, The West Is Wild Again, TIME, March 20,
1995, at 46 (noting that a growing number of citizens are rejecting the federal authority to
tax or control property in general); Ralph R. Reiland, New American RevolutionariesMarch to
a very Different Beat, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, August 19, 1996, at 31 (recounting an interview
with Don Smith, the elected chaplain of the Citizens Militia of Greene County, in which
Don Smith indicated that a second Revolutionary War was not such a bizarre idea, because
King George's tax on five percent of the average income helped to prompt the first
Revolutionary War, and now the federal government takes about forty-five percent). See
also NEIL A. HAMILTON, MILITIA IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 41-42 (1996)
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Revolutionary War declared, at least in part, on the colonists' perception
295
that the Royal Crown of England imposed unfair taxes on them.
Given these historical roots, Americans are particularly distrustful of the
federal government's reasons for levying taxes that contravene good
social policy.296 That distrust threatens the federal government's ability
to collect the tax revenue it needs to function. 297
The federal government should strive to keep the IRC free from any
tax provisions that may cause taxpayers to question the government's
motives. 298
The current taxation of intrafarnilial installment sales
contracts is the kind of tax that would cause taxpayers to lose respect for
the federal government.29 Although one inequitable and unpredictable
tax will not drive American taxpayers to revolt, the inequitable and
unpredictable taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts may
further foment conflict already existing between taxpayers and the
federal government) 00 Similarly, the inequitable and unpredictable
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts gives taxpayers one
more reason to avoid or to evade taxes, causing undesirable economic
consequences.3 1
Therefore, the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts
should be reformed to be both equitable and predictable. In order to

(determining that one of the main platforms of anti-federal militias is the intrusion of the
federal government upon a person's liberty by imposing excessive taxes and other
transgressions).
25 Numerous sources of tax scholarship remain cognizant of this fact. See ADAMS, supra
note 1, at 293-306; JAMES & NOBLES, supra note 4, at 1, 74-75; GROVES, supra note 1, at 5;
PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 51.
296 See PASQUARIELLO, supra note 5, at 51 (stating that the birth of America out of a tax revolt
resulted in an historical trauma, making it a part of an American's culture and tradition to
dislike taxes).
- The federal income tax system is collected through taxpayer self-assessment. See DORIS,
supra note 211, at 7. If the taxpayers no longer trust the federal government, they may no
longer freely assess their own taxes. This would create an administrative burden that the
federal government would be hard pressed to bear.
298 See DORIS, supra note 211, at 14 (noting that the goal of a tax re-examination conducted
by Congress is to strengthen the tax system, to correct inequities, and to obtain a revenue
system that is fair, equitable, neutral in impact between similar dollars of income). Some of
the major themes in the minds of tax-makers is to avoid confrontations with the public over
taxes, because the tax-makers must deal with a public that does not like to be taxed. See
REESE, supra note 236, at xii.
29 The current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts is a tax that may cause
taxpayers to lose faith with the federal tax system, because it lacks equity and
predictability. See supra section V.A.l.a.,b.
"1 See Boroghs et al., supra note 291.
30 See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
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comport with these policies, the safe harbor provision needs revision.
More specifically, the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts
can be both fair and equitable only if the conflict between the Seventh
Circuit and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits is resolved so that the safe
harbor protects taxpayers from additional gift and income tax liability.
The next section analyzes the methods that the federal government could
use to reform the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts.
B. Means of Reform for the Taxation of IntrafamilialSales Contracts
To prevent adverse economic and social consequences, the taxation
of intrafamilial installment sales contracts needs reform. 3°2 For the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts to be equitable, the
safe harbor provision of section 483(e) must insulate parties to a qualified
sale from both imputed interest income tax and below-market loan gift
tax. 303 For the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts to be
predictable, the conflict in the circuits must be resolved. 3°4 Both the
federal courts and Congress possess the power to reform the safe harbor
provision. 30 However, the federal courts and Congress do not share the
same power to reform the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales
contracts. 306 An examination of the different powers of the federal courts
and Congress demonstrates that Congress is the more appropriate forum
to effectuate the necessary reformation to the section 483(e) safe harbor
provision.
1.

Courts and Statutory Interpretation

The federal courts are responsible for interpreting the United States
Constitution.-3 7
The federal courts have jurisdiction over any
congressional statutes and state statutes that implicate the United States
Constitution. 3°8 The IRC is a group of statutes that Congress enacted
under the United States Constitution. 3° 9 Thus, the federal courts have
the power to interpret the IRC, including those provisions related to
intrafamilial installment sales contracts.

32 See supra section V.A.2.ab.
3m See supra section V.A.I.a.
4See supra section V.A.I.b.
'45 See infra notes 304-06,330-31 and accompanying text.
306 See infra notes 330-34 and accompanying text.

3 U.S. CONS'r. art. m, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
See U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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When a federal statute is at issue, a federal court can either strike the
entire statute as violative of the United States Constitution, 310 or it can
interpret the statute to give meaning to ambiguous language. 311 The
issue of whether the safe harbor provision extends into both income and
gift taxation presents the federal courts with an ambiguous language
problem.3 12 The ambiguous language in issue reads as follows: "for
purposes of this title, in the case of any payment - under any contract
for the sale or exchange of any property, and to which this section
applies... "313
This language is ambiguous, because it elicits two
conflicting meanings. 314 It could mean that when section 483 applies,
including the safe harbor provision in an installment sales contract
insulates the taxpayer from all income and gift tax consequences not
described in section 483.315 However, the above language could also
mean that section 483 serves to protect the taxpayer from income
taxation only. 31 6 Thus, a federal court that must rule on the reach of the

310See Illinois v. KruUl, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987) (noting that the biggest deterrent for the

legislature is that statutes may be invalidated for lack of constitutionality).
311Ambiguity can be defined as doubleness of meaning. See NOLAN ET AL., supra note 127,
at 79. The following provides an even clearer description of ambiguity:
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a
statute, document, etc., when good arguments can be made for either of
two contrary positions as to a meaning of a term in a document ...when
application of pertinent rules of interpretation to an instrument as a whole
fails to make certain which one of two or more meanings is conveyed by
the words....
Id. at 79,80. The Supreme Court has recognized the power of the federal courts to interpret
an ambiguous federal statute on several different occasions. See Morse v. Republican Party
of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1218 (1996) (pointing out a doctrine that allows the Court to
interpret ambiguous statutes to have a meaning that will avoid substantial constitutional
questions); Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1993) (commenting that in the case of
statutory ambiguity the Court should use a method of statutory construction that will
construe the statute to have a meaning which does not raise serious constitutional
problems); Steward Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (in which Justice Scalia
concludes that the majority should have construed the ambiguous statute to have a
meaning that would prevent forum shopping).
312 The constitutionality of the provisions of the IRC pertaining to the taxation of
intrafamilial installment sales contracts is not in dispute in any of the relevant cases. See
supra section IV.
31326 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1994).
314See supranote 311.
315This is meaning the Seventh Circuit found in section 483. See supra notes 186-90 and
accompanying text.
316This is the meaning the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the Tax Court found in section
483. See supra notes 203-05,221-21,232-34 and accompanying text.
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safe harbor provision must resolve this ambiguity by assigning section
317
483 a single meaning.
Some of the methods the federal courts used to resolve ambiguous
statutory language are the principles of statutory interpretation.318 Many
different principles of statutory interpretation exist, 319 and the courts do
not treat any one of these principles as definitive. 320 One theory of
statutory interpretation, namely originalism, attempts to determine the
legislative intent behind the language of the statute. 321 Under the
originalist approach, a federal court may consult sources of legislative
322
history even when the language of the statute is apparently clear.
However, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
provide any insight into Congress' intent regarding the reach of the safe

317

The Court can find for one party only if it assigns a single meaning to the statute at issue.

318"Statutory construction" and "statutory interpretation" indicate different systems which

the courts employ to resolve ambiguous statutory language. See Adrienne L. Mickells, The
Uniform Statute and Rule ConstructionAct: Help, Hindrance,or Irrelevancy?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV.
423, 424 (1996) (noting that the terms "statutory construction" and "statutory
interpretation" possess their own separate, technical meaning).
Neither statutory
construction, which uses canons, nor statutory interpretation, which uses theory, is
superior. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 648 (1992) (noting that judges may choose to
ignore the principles of statutory construction and rely on other sources of authority for
resolving ambiguity, such as precedent, legislative history, efficiency, or "fairness"). This
Note will only refer to modes of statutory interpretation, because the Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits chose to evaluate section 483 using the theories of statutory interpretation.
See Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 1995); Krabbenhoft v.
Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1991 ); Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185, 188
(7th Cir. 1988). For further discussion of the canons of statutory construction, see NORMAN
J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUORY CONSTRUCTION (5th ed. 1992).
319The differing modes of statutory interpretation which have evolved over time
demonstrate the lack of conclusivity of any one mode of statutory interpretation. See
Mickells, supra note 318, at 425-31 (1996) (providing a brief overview of the theories of
statutory interpretation from historical to current principles).
32 However, the Supreme Court does predominantly use the strict statutory construction
method of interpretation, which employs the plain meaning rule (resolving conflict
pertaining to the interpretation of a statute by looking to the text of the statute governing
the conflict). Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the
Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435,438 (1994).
321The primary mode of interpretation for federal statutes is originalism, which seeks to
discover and apply the intent of the enacting legislature. Mickells, supra note 318, at 427.
Note that all the cases discussing the reach of the safe harbor provisions attempt to look to
the legislative history. See supra notes 186-90, 203-05, 221-22, 232-34 and accompanying
text.
m See Mickells, supra note 318, at 427,428.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 11

362 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
harbor provision.323 Thus, using the theory of originalism will not help a
federal court determine a single meaning for section 483's ambiguous
language.
Another popular theory of interpretation is the plain meaning
rule.324 Here a court examines the plain text of the statute to determine
its "apparent" or "plain" meaning. 325 The plain meaning rule has
already failed to help the United States Court of Appeals resolve the
ambiguous language in section 483.326 Furthermore, any theory of
statutory interpretation that tries to resolve the ambiguity of the
language in section 483 based on legislative intent or the text of the
statute itself will not provide guidance on how far the safe harbor
provision should reach. 327
Only methods of statutory interpretation which allow a court to
consider "fairness" or public policy will help a federal court resolve the
ambiguous language of section 483. 328 However, past and current
323

The reason for this is that the text of section 483 is ambiguous and the legislative history
does not indicate how far the safe harbor should reach. See supra notes 181-82, 221, 229 and
accompanying text.
324 The United States Supreme Court has employed plain meaning statutory interpretation
on several occasions. See Patterson v Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757-58 (1992); Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 15657 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1991); Ron Pair Enter., Inc. v. Barber 489
U.S. 235,240-45 (1989).
ns See supra note 324.
326 The current conflict in the Circuits is a result of the use of the plain meaning rule to
interpret the opening language of section 483. See supra notes 186-90, 203-06, 232-34 and
accompanying text.
M No legislative history exists on the reach of section 483 for the purposes of gift taxation,
leaving nothing for the court to rely on to determine Congressional intent, and the differing
Circuit opinions have demonstrated that the text of section 483 can be read to have two
"apparent" meanings.
32
Some of these public policy based methods of statutory interpretation are as follows:
1) "Mischief or purpose" rule - the construer of the statute identifies the
deficiency in the common law which the statute was meant to remedy, and then
continues that remedy;
2) "Equity of statute" rule - the judge is allowed to resort to enlarge or restrict
the text of the statute, to the point of nonliteral construction, based on a sense of
equity and purpose;
3) "Public values theory" - judges may participate in the dynamic process of
forming statutes, interpreting them based on current ideas of public policy.
Mickells, supra note 318, at 425, 426, 430. Whereas solid textual arguments do not exist on
this issue, good public policy arguments do exist for extending the safe harbor beyond
income taxation into aid taxation. See supra section V.A.2.a.,b. Therefore, these equity and
policy-based theories of statutory construction, unlike the textual and legislative intent
theories, would actually allow the courts to support a reformation of the taxation of
intrafamilial installment sales contracts.
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judicial opinion considers these policy-based forms of statutory
interpretation a usurpation of congressional power.329 Congress, not the
federal courts, are charged with the duty of implementing social policy
through federal statutes,33 0 including the IRC.331 Because the federal
courts shy away from interpreting congressional statutes to implement
judicial, rather than legislative, policy, 332 and the federal courts need to
use a policy-based mode of statutory interpretation to reform the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts, 333 it seems that
Congress is better suited to resolve the ambiguity of section 483. 3M The
next subsection discusses some other reasons why Congress should
remedy the safe harbor provision instead of the courts.

32 See Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 709 (1974) (in which the

majority stated that in a statutory scheme designed to further a public purpose, it may be
fairly accepted that it did so purposefully, and that if further awards are to be made to
promote the public policy expressed in the legislative action, they should be authorized by
Congress and not the courts); Ins. Group Comm. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 329
U.S. 607, 626 (1947) (in a dissenting opinion Justice Frankfurter recognized that the Court
should carry out the congressionally mandated policy when it must rule on a statute,
because litigation in which statutes are at issue does not allow the Court to exercise
conventional judicial authority). See also Cass R. Sustein, Justice Scalia's Democratic
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCAUA, A MATER OF
INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)) (noting that Justice Scalia
advocates a species of democratic formalism and seeks to develop rules of interpretation
that will limit the policy-making authority and decisional discretion of the judiciary).
330U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Thus, the Supreme Court would probably defer to congressional
policy-making objectives and ignore forms of statutory construction which would
implement any policy which the court manufactured by itself. See Cuevas, supra note 320,
at 439, 440 (noting the hesitancy of the Rehnquist Court to interpret sections of the United
States Code based on equity or other methods that do not rely on the express language of
the IRC).
31 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, as amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
332
See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
333
See supra note 326-28 and accompanying text.
This Note does not argue that Congress alone has the power to reform the taxation of the
safe harbor provisions. Compelling policy reasons exist for allowing the safe harbor
provision to protect taxpayers from income and gift tax consequences. See supra Part
V.A.l.a.,b. See also supra note 120. While the courts must respect legislative supremacy,
they must also keep the law functional, whether the law is statutory or common. See
CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 6. Tax law is supposed to function with predictability and
equity. See supranotes 237-241 and accompanying text. To keep the laws pertaining to the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts functional, the courts could rightfully
rely on policy-based principles of statutory construction to make the safe harbor provisions
both equitable and predictable.
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2.

Congressional Action Regarding the Reform of Section 483

In addition to the argument discussed above, 335 Congress should act
to reform the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts for
other reasons. First, Congress, as the primary legislative power of the
federal government, has plenary power to create and amend its statutes,
including the IRC.-3 Second, as the members of Congress are elected
officials, they enjoy a closer connection to taxpayer input on matters of
taxation than the appointed federal court judges and justices. 337 Finally,
taxpayers will probably blame Congress for implementing bad tax law
before they will blame the federal courts. 338
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION

Congress should amend the language of section 483 to resolve its
current ambiguity and conflict.33 9 The amended language should
unequivocally state that taxpayers will receive protection from both
imputed interest income taxation and below-market loan gift taxation
when they include the safe harbor rate in their intrafamilial installment
sales contracts. The amendment proposed below would affect the
policies of equity and predictability that are currently lacking in the
taxation of intrafarnilial installment sales contracts. 4
A. Proposed Amendment and Official Comment
Rather than disturb the opening language of section 483, Congress
should alter the language of section 483(e) to accomplish the necessary
reform.341 Congress should add a fifth subsection under section 483(e),

supra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
- See JAMEs WILLARD HuRsr, DEALING WITH STATUTES 3 (1982) (noting that although the
court may later strike a statute as invalid on constitutional grounds, no legal barrier
prevents the legislature from amending the common law or statutory law).
" See CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 4 (pointing out that a judge's relationship to the
electorate is at best problematic).
m See D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-the
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 577, 646 (1985) (noting
that the first political check is the application of the regulation to private activity, because
those who are directly affected [the taxpayers in this case] will assign the blame to
Congress).
339
See supra notes 328-38 and accompanying text.
34 See section VI.A.2, B.
34 The opening language of section 483 is part of the general rule dealing with imputed
interest income taxation on those installment sales contracts which do not fall under section
1274. The specific provision relating to the application of the safe harbor provision against
other provisions of the IRC is really at issue here, not the general rule contained under the
335See
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similar to the one drafted below. Congress should also include an
official comment that explains the reasons for and effects of the
amendment to section 483(e).
1.

Proposed Amendment

(5) Application of the Safe Harbor to Other Sections Under this
Title. No additional gift, estate or income tax shall be recognized under
any other section of this title on installment sales contracts that conform
to the requirements of Paragraph (1).342
2.

Official Comment on the Proposed Amendment

Official Comment to Section 483(e)(5).--This new section resolves
the ambiguity surrounding the safe harbor provision of 26 U.S.C. §
483(e).
The ambiguity centered around whether the safe harbor
provision would protect taxpayers from additional gift tax as well as
imputed income tax. The United States Court of Appeals generated
conflicting holdings on this issue. In Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit held that the section 483(e) safe
harbor rate insulated a taxpayer from gift taxes as well as income taxes.
However, in Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991) and
Schusterman v. United States, 939 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995), the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits held that the section 483(e) safe harbor rate protected the
taxpayer from additional income tax liability only. This conflict ushered

opening language. Therefore, it seems easier to correct the ambiguous language at the safe
harbor provision of section 483 rather than at its general rule.
The amended text of section 483 (e) would read as follows:
(e) Maximum rate of interest on certain transfers of land between related parties.
(1) In general-In the case of any qualified sale, the discount rate used in
determining the total unstated interest rate under subsection (b) shall not exceed
6 percent, compounded semiannually.
(2) Qualified Sale.-For the purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified
sale" means any sale or exchange of land by an individual to a member of such
individual's family (within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)).
(3) $500,000 limitation.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any qualified sale
between individuals made during any calendar year to the extent that such sales
price for such sale (when added to the aggregate sales price for prior qualified
sales between such individuals during the calendar year) exceeds $500,000.
(4) Nonresident alien individuals.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any sale
or exchange if any party to such sale or exchange is a nonresident alien
individual.
(5) Application of the safe harbor to other sections under this title.-No additional
gift or income tax shall be recognized under any other section of this title on installment
sales contracts which conform to the requirementsof paragraph(1).
(italics is only used to indicate the text that would be included after the amendment).
3Q
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the undesirable elements of inequity and unpredictability into the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. The safe harbor
provision needed this amendment to resolve this conflict so that the
taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts could become
equitable and predictable.
The amendment includes broad language that will protect taxpayers
from any additional income or gift tax consequences. Thus, taxpayers,
regardless of financial circumstances, can now use the safe harbor
provision and be certain that the only tax they will pay is on the interest
rate under the safe harbor. This amendment plugs the loopholes that
were available to certain taxpayers under the ambiguous safe harbor
provision. Furthermore, this amendment will allow tax planners and
attorneys to offer their clients concrete advice about how the federal
government will tax an intrafamilial installment sales contract. In
summary, this amendment both resolves the ambiguity surrounding the
former safe harbor provision and brings equity and predictability into
the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts.
B.

Effect of the Proposed Amendment on Mrs. Barnes, Mr. Sheers, and Ms.
Vreet

Having discussed the proposed amendment to the safe harbor
provision in an official comment, this note turns to analyze the effects of
the proposed amendment on Mrs. Barnes', Mr. Sheers', and Ms. Vreet's
situations. Under the proposed amendment, Mrs. Barnes does not need
to include the fair market interest rate in her installment sales contract
with her son in order to protect herself from additional gift taxes. 343 She
can simply charge her son a minimal six percent interest rate and remain
free of any tax consequences outside of the regular income taxation of
principal and interest.
The proposed amendment would also prevent Mr. Sheers from
enjoying a tax break that would not be available to Mrs. Barnes. 344 The
proposed amendment would prevent the imposition of gift tax on either
Remember Mrs. Barnes does not want to force her son to pay any interest other than the
amount which is absolutely necessary to protect her from taxation that she cannot afford.
See supra section I.
3" The proposed amendment to section 483 would probably not affect Mr. Sheers personal
tax situation much. He plans to include the fair market interest rate in his installment sales
contract with his daughter anyway. However, he would disguise any interest payment
above the safe harbor as a principal payment to save him from paying ordinary income tax
on all the interest. Thus, Mr. Sheers would most likely not be subject to gift tax
consequences anyway. But see supra note 274.
34'
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Mrs. Barnes' or Mr. Sheers' installment sales contracts, regardless of how
they manipulate interest and principal payments. Under the proposed
amendment, the IRS could not assess a gift tax on Mrs. Barnes'
installment sales contract with her son and at the same time fail to assess
a gift tax on Mr. Sheers.345 Therefore, Mrs. Barnes would not perceive
the unfairness that currently plagues the taxation of intrafamilial
346
installment sales contracts.
The proposed amendment would also allow Ms. Vreet to accurately
advise Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Sheers about the tax liability that will attach
to their installment sales contracts. 347 Ms. Vreet would be certain that
including the safe harbor interest rate in her clients' installment sales
contracts would not elicit undesirable gift tax consequences. The
proposed amendment would reconcile the conflict in the circuits by
clearly defining the reach of the safe harbor once and for all. Mrs. Barnes
and Mr. Sheers could then determine the exact amount they must budget
for paying the taxes on their installment sales contracts. They cannot
create such an accurate budget under the current taxation of intrafamilial
installment sales contracts. 34
Therefore, the proposed amendment
would make the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts both
equitable and predictable, taking away the legitimate complaints that
taxpayers can make right now. 349

3 See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
346 See supra section V.A.1.a.
347 See supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text for Ms. Vreet's dilemma.
m See supra section V.A.1.b.
349See supra section V.A.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The current taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts
creates a tax trap. Section 483 promises taxpayers that they will be
protected from excess taxation if they include a safe harbor interest rate
in qualified installment sales. However, this protection proves to be
ethereal, because taxpayers that follow the safe harbor provision find
themselves subject to gift tax liabilities. Congress should amend section
483 to include language that allows the safe harbor to protect taxpayers
from additional gift or income tax liability. Including this language
would promote the important social goals of equity and predictability in
the taxation of intrafamilial installment sales contracts. Finally, Congress
should enact the proposed amendment, because reform is necessary, and
Congress is best suited to remedy this problem.
-Stephen J. Wolma
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